ABSTRACT
Background: Perforations of surgical gloves are common and increase with the duration of glove wear. Skin flora, re-grown after pre-operative disinfection of the hands, may contaminate a surgical site. An antimicrobial surgical glove with chlorhexidine on its inner surface has been developed. We hypothesized that by suppressing the re-growth of skin flora during the complete course of a surgical procedure, antimicrobial gloves may reduce the risk of surgical site contamination in the event of an intra-operative glove breach.
Methods: We conducted a randomized, double-blind, single-center trial, to measure any differences in the bacterial skin populations of surgeons' hands during surgical procedures done with antimicrobial and non-antimicrobial surgical gloves [ISRCTN71391952]. In this study, 25 pairs of gloves were retrieved from 14 surgeons who donned them randomly on their dominant or non-dominant hand. The number of bacteria retrieved from glove fluid was measured and expressed as colony forming units (CFU)/mL.
Results: The median cfu/mL of antimicrobial gloves was 0.00 (LQ: 0.00 CFU/mL; UQ: 0.00 cfu/mL), with a mean log10 cfu/mL=0.02 (range: 0.00–0.30). The median CFU/mL of non-antimicrobial gloves was 54.00 (LQ: 3.00 cfu/mL; UQ: 100.00 cfu/mL) with a mean log10 CFU/mL=1.32 (range: 0.00–2.39). After a mean operating time of 112 min, the difference in the log10 CFU/mL was 1.30 (p<0.001).
Conclusions: A new antimicrobial surgical glove suppressed surgeons' hand flora during operative procedures. In the event of a glove breach, the use of such a glove may have the potential to prevent bacterial contamination of a sterile surgical site, thereby decreasing the risk of surgical site infection (SSI) and increasing patient safety. Further clinical studies are needed to confirm this concept.
Reference
Assadian O, Kramer A, Ouriel K et al. Suppression of Surgeons' Bacterial Hand Flora during Surgical Procedures with a New Antimicrobial Surgical Glove. Surg Infect (Larchmt). Feb 1, 2014; 15(1): 43–49.
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miércoles, 12 de marzo de 2014
lunes, 10 de marzo de 2014
How and when to write policies and procedures ?
This book was created to:
← Help you work out what to write and when and
← Make writing and reviewing easier
The writing of policies and procedures takes time and can be disliked by busy people focussed on providing a service. Policy and procedure manuals fall into disuse because they are too big and out of date.
This booklet has been designed to help you identify when you ought to have a written policy or procedure, thereby reducing the risk of manuals so large as to be useless. It will serve to reduce the time commitment associated with the writing of policies and procedures, through the provision of framework for the writing and you will be provided with a structure for reviewing your policies and procedures.
Reference
viernes, 7 de marzo de 2014
Kinetics of ozone inactivation of infectious prion protein
ABSTRACT
The kinetics of ozone inactivation of infectious prion protein (PrPSc, scrapie 263K) was investigated in ozone-demand-free phosphate-buffered saline (PBS). Diluted infectious brain homogenates (IBH) (0.01%) were exposed to a predetermined ozone dose (10.8 ± 2.0 mg/liter) at three pHs (pH 4.4, 6.0, and 8.0) and two temperatures (4°C and 20°C). The inactivation of PrPSc was quantified by determining the in vitro destruction of PrPSc templating properties using the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) assay and bioassay, which were shown to correlate well. The inactivation kinetics were characterized by both Chick-Watson (CW) and efficiency factor Hom (EFH) models. It was found that the EFH model fit the experimental data more appropriately. The efficacy of ozone inactivation of PrPSc was both pH and temperature dependent. Based on the EFH model, CT (disinfectant concentration multiplied by contact time) values were determined for 2-log10, 3-log10, and 4-log10 inactivation at the conditions under which they were achieved. Our results indicated that ozone is effective for prion inactivation in ozone-demand-free water and may be applied for the inactivation of infectious prion in prion-contaminated water and wastewater.
The kinetics of ozone inactivation of infectious prion protein (PrPSc, scrapie 263K) was investigated in ozone-demand-free phosphate-buffered saline (PBS). Diluted infectious brain homogenates (IBH) (0.01%) were exposed to a predetermined ozone dose (10.8 ± 2.0 mg/liter) at three pHs (pH 4.4, 6.0, and 8.0) and two temperatures (4°C and 20°C). The inactivation of PrPSc was quantified by determining the in vitro destruction of PrPSc templating properties using the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) assay and bioassay, which were shown to correlate well. The inactivation kinetics were characterized by both Chick-Watson (CW) and efficiency factor Hom (EFH) models. It was found that the EFH model fit the experimental data more appropriately. The efficacy of ozone inactivation of PrPSc was both pH and temperature dependent. Based on the EFH model, CT (disinfectant concentration multiplied by contact time) values were determined for 2-log10, 3-log10, and 4-log10 inactivation at the conditions under which they were achieved. Our results indicated that ozone is effective for prion inactivation in ozone-demand-free water and may be applied for the inactivation of infectious prion in prion-contaminated water and wastewater.
Reference
Ding N, Neumann NF, Price LM, Braithwaite SL, Balachandran A, Mitchell G, Belosevic M, Gamal El-Din M. Kinetics of ozone inactivation of infectious prion protein. Appl Environ Microbiol. 2013 Apr;79(8):2721-30.
miércoles, 5 de marzo de 2014
Clinical Documentation and Data Transfer from #Ebola and #Marburg #Virus Disease Wards in Outbreak Settings
Abstract
Understanding human filovirus hemorrhagic fever (FHF) clinical manifestations and evaluating treatment strategies require the collection of clinical data in outbreak settings, where clinical documentation has been limited. Currently, no consensus among filovirus outbreak-response organisations guides best practice for clinical documentation and data transfer. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with health care workers (HCWs) involved in FHF outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa, and with HCWs experienced in documenting and transferring data from high-risk areas (isolation wards or biosafety level 4 laboratories). Methods for data documentation and transfer were identified, described in detail and categorised by requirement for electricity and ranked by interviewee preference. Some methods involve removing paperwork and other objects from the filovirus disease ward without disinfection. We believe that if done properly, these methods are reasonably safe for certain settings. However, alternative methods avoiding the removal of objects, or involving the removal of paperwork or objects after non-damaging disinfection, are available. These methods are not only safer, they are also perceived as safer and likely more acceptable to health workers and members of the community. The use of standardised clinical forms is overdue. Experiments with by sunlight disinfection should continue, and non-damaging disinfection of impregnated paper, suitable tablet computers and underwater cameras should be evaluated under field conditions.
Reference
Bühler S, Roddy P, Nolte E, Borchert M. Clinical documentation and data transfer from ebola and marburg virus disease wards in outbreak settings: health care workers' experiences and preferences. Viruses. 2014 Feb 19;6(2):927-37.
martes, 4 de marzo de 2014
Análsis genético de la Plaga de Justiniano
Abstract
BACKGROUND:
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| Justiniano. Emperador del Imperio Bizantino. |
METHODS:
Teeth were removed from two individuals (known as A120 and A76) from the early medieval Aschheim-Bajuwarenring cemetery (Aschheim, Bavaria, Germany). We isolated DNA from the teeth using a modified phenol-chloroform method. We screened DNA extracts for the presence of the Y pestis-specific pla gene on the pPCP1 plasmid using primers and standards from an established assay, enriched the DNA, and then sequenced it. We reconstructed draft genomes of the infectious Y pestis strains, compared them with a database of genomes from 131 Y pestis strains from the second and third pandemics, and constructed a maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree.
FINDINGS:
Radiocarbon dating of both individuals (A120 to 533 AD [plus or minus 98 years]; A76 to 504 AD [plus or minus 61 years]) places them in the timeframe of the first pandemic. Our phylogeny contains a novel branch (100% bootstrap at all relevant nodes) leading to the twoJustinian samples. This branch has no known contemporary representatives, and thus is either extinct or unsampled in wild rodent reservoirs. TheJustinian branch is interleaved between two extant groups, 0.ANT1 and 0.ANT2, and is distant from strains associated with the second and third pandemics.
INTERPRETATION:
We conclude that the Y pestis lineages that caused the Plague of Justinian and the Black Death 800 years later were independent emergences from rodents into human beings. These results show that rodent species worldwide represent important reservoirs for the repeated emergence of diverse lineages of Y pestis into human populations.References
- Wagner DM, Klunk J, Harbeck M, Devault A, et al. Yersinia pestis and the Plague of Justinian 541-543 AD: a genomic analysis. Lancet Infect Dis. 2014 Jan 27. pii: S1473-3099(13)70323-2.
- Harbeck M, Seifert L, Hänsch S, et al. Yersinia pestis DNA from skeletal remains from the 6(th) century AD reveals insights into Justinianic Plague. PLoS Pathog. 2013;9(5):e1003349.
- The Death Toll of Justinian’s Plague and Its Effects on the Byzantine Empire
- 1,500-year-old plague victims shed light on disease origins
lunes, 3 de marzo de 2014
VIDEO: Contamination of Stethoscopes and Physicians' Hands After a Physical Examination
Abstract
Objectives: To compare the contamination level of physicians’ hands and stethoscopes and to explore the risk of cross-transmission of microorganisms through the use of stethoscopes.
Patients and Methods: We conducted a structured prospective study between January 1, 2009, and May 31, 2009, involving 83 inpatients at a Swiss university teaching hospital. After a standardized physical examination, 4 regions of the physician’s gloved or ungloved dominant hand and 2 sections of the stethoscopes were pressed onto selective and nonselective media; 489 surfaces were sampled. Total aerobic colony counts (ACCs) and total methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) colony-forming unit (CFU) counts were assessed.
Results: Median total ACCs (interquartile range) for fingertips, thenar eminence, hypothenar eminence, hand dorsum, stethoscope diaphragm, and tube were 467, 37, 34, 8, 89, and 18, respectively. The contamination level of the diaphgm was lower than the contamination level of the fingertips (P<.001) but higher than the contamination level of the thenar eminence (P1⁄4.004). The MRSA contamination level of the diaphragm was higher than the MRSA contamination level of the thenar eminence (7 CFUs/25 cm2 vs 4 CFUs/25 cm2; P1⁄4.004). The correlation analysis for both total ACCs and MRSA CFU counts revealed that the contamination level of the diaphragm was associated with the contamination level of the fingertips (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, r1⁄40.80; P<.001 and r1⁄40.76; P<.001, respectively). Similarly, the contamination level of the stethoscope tube increased with the increase in the contamination level of the fingertips for both total ACCs and MRSA CFU counts (r1⁄40.56; P<.001 and r1⁄4.59; P<.001, respectively).
Conclusion: These results suggest that the contamination level of the stethoscope is substantial after a single physical examination and comparable to the contamination of parts of the physician’s dominant hand.
Objectives: To compare the contamination level of physicians’ hands and stethoscopes and to explore the risk of cross-transmission of microorganisms through the use of stethoscopes.
Patients and Methods: We conducted a structured prospective study between January 1, 2009, and May 31, 2009, involving 83 inpatients at a Swiss university teaching hospital. After a standardized physical examination, 4 regions of the physician’s gloved or ungloved dominant hand and 2 sections of the stethoscopes were pressed onto selective and nonselective media; 489 surfaces were sampled. Total aerobic colony counts (ACCs) and total methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) colony-forming unit (CFU) counts were assessed.
Results: Median total ACCs (interquartile range) for fingertips, thenar eminence, hypothenar eminence, hand dorsum, stethoscope diaphragm, and tube were 467, 37, 34, 8, 89, and 18, respectively. The contamination level of the diaphgm was lower than the contamination level of the fingertips (P<.001) but higher than the contamination level of the thenar eminence (P1⁄4.004). The MRSA contamination level of the diaphragm was higher than the MRSA contamination level of the thenar eminence (7 CFUs/25 cm2 vs 4 CFUs/25 cm2; P1⁄4.004). The correlation analysis for both total ACCs and MRSA CFU counts revealed that the contamination level of the diaphragm was associated with the contamination level of the fingertips (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, r1⁄40.80; P<.001 and r1⁄40.76; P<.001, respectively). Similarly, the contamination level of the stethoscope tube increased with the increase in the contamination level of the fingertips for both total ACCs and MRSA CFU counts (r1⁄40.56; P<.001 and r1⁄4.59; P<.001, respectively).
Conclusion: These results suggest that the contamination level of the stethoscope is substantial after a single physical examination and comparable to the contamination of parts of the physician’s dominant hand.
Reference
Longtin Y, Schneider A, Tschopp C, Renzi G, Gayet-Ageron A, Schrenzel J, Pittet D. Contamination of Stethoscopes and Physicians’ Hands After a Physical Examination. Mayo Clin Proc. n March 2014;89(3):291-299
jueves, 27 de febrero de 2014
Acetic Acid, the Active Component of Vinegar, Is an EffectiveTuberculocidal Disinfectant
ABSTRACT
Effective and economical mycobactericidal disinfectants are needed to kill both Mycobacterium tuberculosis and non-M. tuberculosis mycobacteria. We found that acetic acid (vinegar) efficiently kills M. tuberculosis after 30 min of exposure to a 6% acetic acid solution. The activity is not due to pH alone, and propionic acid also appears to be bactericidal. M. bolletii and M. massiliense nontuberculous mycobacteria were more resistant, although a 30-min exposure to 10% acetic acid resulted in at least a 6-log10 reduction of viable bacteria. Acetic acid (vinegar) is an effective mycobactericidal disinfectant that should also be active against most other bacteria. These findings are consistent with and extend the results of studies performed in the early and mid-20th century on the disinfectant capacity of organic acids. IMPORTANCE Mycobacteria are best known for causing tuberculosis and leprosy, but infections with nontuberculous mycobacteria are an increasing problem after surgical or cosmetic procedures or in the lungs of cystic fibrosis and immunosuppressed patients. Killing mycobacteria is important because Mycobacterium tuberculosis strains can be multidrug resistant and therefore potentially fatal biohazards, and environmental mycobacteria must be thoroughly eliminated from surgical implements and respiratory equipment. Currently used mycobactericidal disinfectants can be toxic, unstable, and expensive. We fortuitously found that acetic acid kills mycobacteria and then showed that it is an effective mycobactericidal agent, even against the very resistant, clinically important Mycobacterium abscessus complex. Vinegar has been used for thousands of years as a common disinfectant, and if it can kill mycobacteria, the most disinfectant-resistant bacteria, it may prove to be a broadly effective, economical biocide with potential usefulness in health care settings and laboratories, especially in resource-poor countries.
Effective and economical mycobactericidal disinfectants are needed to kill both Mycobacterium tuberculosis and non-M. tuberculosis mycobacteria. We found that acetic acid (vinegar) efficiently kills M. tuberculosis after 30 min of exposure to a 6% acetic acid solution. The activity is not due to pH alone, and propionic acid also appears to be bactericidal. M. bolletii and M. massiliense nontuberculous mycobacteria were more resistant, although a 30-min exposure to 10% acetic acid resulted in at least a 6-log10 reduction of viable bacteria. Acetic acid (vinegar) is an effective mycobactericidal disinfectant that should also be active against most other bacteria. These findings are consistent with and extend the results of studies performed in the early and mid-20th century on the disinfectant capacity of organic acids. IMPORTANCE Mycobacteria are best known for causing tuberculosis and leprosy, but infections with nontuberculous mycobacteria are an increasing problem after surgical or cosmetic procedures or in the lungs of cystic fibrosis and immunosuppressed patients. Killing mycobacteria is important because Mycobacterium tuberculosis strains can be multidrug resistant and therefore potentially fatal biohazards, and environmental mycobacteria must be thoroughly eliminated from surgical implements and respiratory equipment. Currently used mycobactericidal disinfectants can be toxic, unstable, and expensive. We fortuitously found that acetic acid kills mycobacteria and then showed that it is an effective mycobactericidal agent, even against the very resistant, clinically important Mycobacterium abscessus complex. Vinegar has been used for thousands of years as a common disinfectant, and if it can kill mycobacteria, the most disinfectant-resistant bacteria, it may prove to be a broadly effective, economical biocide with potential usefulness in health care settings and laboratories, especially in resource-poor countries.
Reference
Cortesia C, Vilchèze C, Bernut A, Contreras W, Gómez K, de Waard J, Jacobs WR Jr, Kremer L, Takiff H. Acetic Acid, the active component of vinegar, is an effective tuberculocidal disinfectant. MBio. 2014 Feb 25;5(2).
miércoles, 26 de febrero de 2014
Susceptibility of high-risk human papillomavirus type 16 to clinical disinfectants
Abstract
Objectives: Little to nothing is known about human papillomavirus (HPV) susceptibility to disinfection. HPV is estimated to be among the most common sexually transmitted diseases in humans. HPV is also the causative agent of cervical cancers and other anogenital cancers and is responsible for a significant portion of oropharyngeal cancers. While sexual transmission is well documented, vertical and non-sexual transmission may also be important.
Methods: Using recombinant HPV16 particles (quasivirions) and authentic HPV16 grown in three-dimensional organotypic human epithelial culture, we tested the susceptibility of high-risk HPV to clinical disinfectants. Infectious viral particles were incubated with 11 common clinical disinfectants, appropriate neutralizers were added to inactivate the disinfectant and solutions were filter centrifuged. Changes in the infectivity titres of the disinfectant-treated virus were measured compared with untreated virus.
Results: HPV16 is a highly resistant virus; more so than other non-enveloped viruses previously tested. The HPV16 quasivirions showed similar resistance to native virions, except for being susceptible to isopropanol, the triple phenolic and the lower concentration peracetic acid-silver (PAA-silver)-based disinfectant. Authentic virus and quasivirus were resistant to glutaraldehyde and ortho-phthalaldehyde and susceptible to hypochlorite and the higher concentration PAA-silver-based disinfectant.
Conclusions We present the first disinfectant susceptibility data on HPV16 native virions, which show that commonly used clinical disinfectants, including those used as sterilants in medical and dental healthcare facilities, have no effect on HPV16 infectivity. Policy changes concerning disinfectant use are needed. The unusually high resistance of HPV16 to disinfection supports other data suggesting the possibility of fomite or non-sexual transmission of HPV16.
Objectives: Little to nothing is known about human papillomavirus (HPV) susceptibility to disinfection. HPV is estimated to be among the most common sexually transmitted diseases in humans. HPV is also the causative agent of cervical cancers and other anogenital cancers and is responsible for a significant portion of oropharyngeal cancers. While sexual transmission is well documented, vertical and non-sexual transmission may also be important.
![]() |
| allaboutcanceronline.info/ |
Results: HPV16 is a highly resistant virus; more so than other non-enveloped viruses previously tested. The HPV16 quasivirions showed similar resistance to native virions, except for being susceptible to isopropanol, the triple phenolic and the lower concentration peracetic acid-silver (PAA-silver)-based disinfectant. Authentic virus and quasivirus were resistant to glutaraldehyde and ortho-phthalaldehyde and susceptible to hypochlorite and the higher concentration PAA-silver-based disinfectant.
Conclusions We present the first disinfectant susceptibility data on HPV16 native virions, which show that commonly used clinical disinfectants, including those used as sterilants in medical and dental healthcare facilities, have no effect on HPV16 infectivity. Policy changes concerning disinfectant use are needed. The unusually high resistance of HPV16 to disinfection supports other data suggesting the possibility of fomite or non-sexual transmission of HPV16.
Este artículo no se encuentra libre :o(
Referencias:
- Meyers J, Ryndock E, Conway MJ, Meyers C, Robison R. Susceptibility ofhigh-risk human papillomavirus type 16 to clinical disinfectants. J Antimicrob Chemother. 2014 Feb 4.
- Roden RB, Lowy DR, Schiller JT. Papillomavirus is resistant to desiccation. J Infect Dis. 1997 Oct;176(4):1076-9.
martes, 25 de febrero de 2014
Laboratory activities involving transmissible spongiform encephalopathy causing agents
Abstract
Since the appearance in 1986 of epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a new form of neurological disease in cattle which also affected human beings, many diagnostic and research activities have been performed to develop detection and therapeutic tools. A lot of progress was made in better identifying, understanding and controlling the spread of the disease by appropriate monitoring and control programs in European countries. This paper reviews the recent knowledge on pathogenesis, transmission and persistence outside the host of prion, the causative agent of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in mammals with a particular focus on risk (re)assessment and management of biosafety measures to be implemented in diagnostic and research laboratories in Belgium. Also, in response to the need of an increasing number of European diagnostic laboratories stopping TSE diagnosis due to a decreasing number of TSE cases reported in the last years, decontamination procedures and a protocol for decommissioning TSE diagnostic laboratories is proposed.
REFERENCES:
Since the appearance in 1986 of epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a new form of neurological disease in cattle which also affected human beings, many diagnostic and research activities have been performed to develop detection and therapeutic tools. A lot of progress was made in better identifying, understanding and controlling the spread of the disease by appropriate monitoring and control programs in European countries. This paper reviews the recent knowledge on pathogenesis, transmission and persistence outside the host of prion, the causative agent of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in mammals with a particular focus on risk (re)assessment and management of biosafety measures to be implemented in diagnostic and research laboratories in Belgium. Also, in response to the need of an increasing number of European diagnostic laboratories stopping TSE diagnosis due to a decreasing number of TSE cases reported in the last years, decontamination procedures and a protocol for decommissioning TSE diagnostic laboratories is proposed.REFERENCES:
- Amaya Leunda, Bernadette Van Vaerenbergh, Aline Baldo, Stefan Roels, and Philippe Herman. Laboratory activities involving transmissible spongiform encephalopathy causing agents. Prion. 2013 September 1; 7(5): 420–433.
lunes, 24 de febrero de 2014
Primera semana de salud 2014, del 22 al 28 de febrero #vacunas
Del 22 al 28 de febrero las acciones de vacunación se intensificarán a nivel nacional para aplicar vía oral la vacuna Sabin a menores de 5 años. Con esta actividad, ayudarás a mantener erradicada la Polio en nuestro país.
No olvides llevar su Cartilla Nacional de Salud, en ella, el personal de enfermería registrará la aplicación de las vacunas.
Actividades complementarias:
1. Aplicación de todas las vacunas para iniciar o completar esquemas de vacunación en los menores de ocho años de edad, mujeres en edad fértil y grupos poblacionales específicos.
2. Aplicación a embarazadas de la vacuna contra el tétanos, para proteger a sus bebés contra el tétanos neonatal.
3. Distribución de sobres para preparar soluciones hidratantes (Vida Suero Oral).
4. Proporcionar información a los responsables de menores de cinco años para su adecuado uso en el tratamiento de cuadro diarreico.
Para mayor informacion visiten:
#Bioseguridad en redes sociales...
Las redes sociales nos ayudan a estar en contacto con ustedes. A continuación algunas donde pueden encontrarnos...
viernes, 21 de febrero de 2014
Convocatorias para el VI Simposio #AMexBio #SIBB14
VI Simposio Internacional de Bioseguridad y Biocustodia,
En las instalaciones de la Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León
Monterrey, Nuevo León, México.
CONVOCATORIA PARA IMPARTIR CURSOS PRESIMPOSIO
Para propuestas de cursos presimposio a impartirse los días 4 y/o 5 de junio de 2014. Las propuestas serán recibidas del hasta el 1° de marzo de 2014.
En las instalaciones de la Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León
Monterrey, Nuevo León, México.
Para propuestas de cursos presimposio a impartirse los días 4 y/o 5 de junio de 2014. Las propuestas serán recibidas del hasta el 1° de marzo de 2014.
Para presentar trabajos libres los días 6 al 7 de junio de 2014. Los resúmenes serán recibidos hasta el 10 de abril de 2014
Descargar en => http://amexbio.org/
Etiquetas:
#SocialMedia,
AMexBio,
Cursos
Ubicación:
Monterrey, NL, México
viernes, 14 de febrero de 2014
Productos #AMexBio #sibb2014
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| Miembros AMexBio $130.- (MXP) Público en general $180.- (MXP) + gastos de envío. Adquiérelo en: www.amexbio.wildapricot.org |
Además, podrán recibir información directa de la AMexBio, en su correo electrónico.
Este año 2014, festejamos el quinto aniversario de la Asociación Mexicana de Bioseguridad A.C. www.amexbio.org
PRÓXIMAMENTE:
VI Simposio Internacional de Bioseguridad y Biocustodia
4 - 7 junio 2014
Monterrey, Nuevo León, México
Invitan: Asociación Mexicana de Bioseguridad y Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.
viernes, 7 de febrero de 2014
LIBRO: Preparación y repuesta a la entrada de virus #chikungunya en lasAméricas
La fiebre chikungunya (CHIK) es una enfermedad emergente transmitida
por mosquitos y causada por un alfavirus, el virus chikungunya
(CHIKV). Esta enfermedad es transmitida principalmente por los
mosquitos Aedes aegypti y Ae. albopictus, las mismas especies involucradas en la
transmisión del dengue. Estas guías fueron concebidas para ser adaptadas por cada País Miembro. Están
diseñadas para mejorar los conocimientos sobre esta amenaza y para brindar las
herramientas necesarias que permitan establecer las estrategias más adecuadas
para prevenir la importación de CHIKV a la Región, o para su control en caso
de introducción. Proporcionan orientación sobre cómo detectar un brote de
la enfermedad, desarrollar las investigaciones epidemiológicas pertinentes y
prevenir o mitigar la diseminación de la enfermedad en la Región.
REFERENCIA:
Preparación y respuesta ante la eventual introducción del virus chikungunya en las Américas
Organización Panamericana de la Salud, © 2011
Preparación y respuesta ante la eventual introducción del virus chikungunya en las Américas
Organización Panamericana de la Salud, © 2011
miércoles, 5 de febrero de 2014
viernes, 31 de enero de 2014
#VIDEOS: Toma de muestras para diagnóstico de #influenza #EPP #Transporte
EQUIPO DE PROTECCIÓN PERSONAL PARA
TOMA DE MUESTRAS NASOFARÍNGEAS
TOMA DE MUESTRAS NASOFARÍNGEAS
TOMA DE MUESTRAS NASOFARINGEAS
EMPAQUE DE MUESTRAS
Curso: Capacitación en prevención de infecciones respiratorias #Influenza
Cómo utilizar los módulos de capacitación
Los módulos de capacitación están divididos en 6 presentaciones, complementarias más independientes. Se espera que el comité de control de infecciones o equipo responsable por educación del personal en salud utilicen estas presentaciones para la actualización del personal de salud y comunidad en el tema de medidas de prevención y control de infecciones con enfoque en las enfermedades respiratorias.
Se sugiere también que antes y después de la capacitación los participantes sean evaluados con la "Evaluación de la capacitación" para que se pueda saber cuál es el impacto de la capacitación en el conocimiento del personal de salud sobre el tema.
REFERENCIA:
Curso: Capacitación en prevención de infecciones en los servicios de salud con enfoque en las enfermedades respiratorias
Los módulos de capacitación están divididos en 6 presentaciones, complementarias más independientes. Se espera que el comité de control de infecciones o equipo responsable por educación del personal en salud utilicen estas presentaciones para la actualización del personal de salud y comunidad en el tema de medidas de prevención y control de infecciones con enfoque en las enfermedades respiratorias.
Se sugiere también que antes y después de la capacitación los participantes sean evaluados con la "Evaluación de la capacitación" para que se pueda saber cuál es el impacto de la capacitación en el conocimiento del personal de salud sobre el tema.
REFERENCIA:
Curso: Capacitación en prevención de infecciones en los servicios de salud con enfoque en las enfermedades respiratorias
lunes, 27 de enero de 2014
@ssalud_mx activa plan centinela por #Influenza #AH1N1
NOTICIAS:
La Secretaría de Salud (Ssa) espera que se den todavía de 3 a 5 semanas más de aumento en los casos y fallecimientos por influenza, por lo que mantiene en alerta a 583 unidades centinelas en hospitales de primer, segundo y tercer nivel.
REFERENCIAS
La Secretaría de Salud (Ssa) espera que se den todavía de 3 a 5 semanas más de aumento en los casos y fallecimientos por influenza, por lo que mantiene en alerta a 583 unidades centinelas en hospitales de primer, segundo y tercer nivel.
REFERENCIAS
- Material para prevención y promoción de la influenza
- Dirección General de promoción a la salud
- Lineamiento para la vigilancia epidemiológica de la influenza
jueves, 23 de enero de 2014
Tuberculosis Laboratory #Biosafety Manual
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Laboratory biosafety is the process of applying a combination of administrative controls, containment principles, practices and procedures, safety equipment, emergency preparedness, and facilities to enable laboratory staff to work safely with potentially infectious microorganisms; biosafety also aims at preventing unintentional exposure to pathogens or their accidental release. This manual describes the minimum biosafety measures that should be implemented at the different levels of tuberculosis (TB) testing laboratories to reduce the risk of a laboratory-acquired infection.
Contents
Introduction
1. Risk assessment and the classification of TB laboratories
2. Essential biosafety measures for TB laboratories
3. Low-risk TB laboratories
4. Moderate-risk TB laboratories
5. High-risk TB laboratories (TB-containment laboratories)
6. Safety equipment
7. Personal protective equipment and clothing
8. Plans for emergency preparedness and response
9. References
Tuberculosis Laboratory Biosafety Manual
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2012.
ISBN-13: 978-92-4-150463-8
Copyright and Permissions
PDF version of this title (929K)
lunes, 20 de enero de 2014
Apoyen a la #AMexBio.
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Este año 2014, festejamos el quinto aniversario de la Asociación Mexicana de Bioseguridad A.C.
PRÓXIMAMENTE:
VI Simposio Internacional de Bioseguridad y Biocustodia
4 - 7 junio 2014
Monterrey, Nuevo León, México
Invitan: Asociación Mexicana de Bioseguridad y Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.
ABSL-4 Aerobiology Biosafety and Technology...
Abstract
The overall threat of a viral pathogen to human populations is largely determined by the modus operandi and velocity of the pathogen that is transmitted among humans. Microorganisms that can spread by aerosol are considered a more challenging enemy than those that require direct body-to-body contact for transmission, due to the potential for infection of numerous people rather than a single individual. Additionally, disease containment is much more difficult to achieve for aerosolized viral pathogens than for pathogens that spread solely via direct person-to-person contact. Thus, aerobiology has become an increasingly necessary component for studying viral pathogens that are naturally or intentionally transmitted by aerosol. The goal of studying aerosol viral pathogens is to improve public health preparedness and medical countermeasure development. Here, we provide a brief overview of the animal biosafety level 4 Aerobiology Core at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland, USA.
REFERENCE:
Lackemeyer MG, Kok-Mercado Fd, Wada J, Bollinger L, Kindrachuk J, Wahl-Jensen V, Kuhn JH, Jahrling PB. ABSL-4 Aerobiology Biosafety and Technology at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick. Viruses. 2014 Jan 7;6(1):137-50. doi: 10.3390/v6010137. PubMed PMID: 24402304.
The overall threat of a viral pathogen to human populations is largely determined by the modus operandi and velocity of the pathogen that is transmitted among humans. Microorganisms that can spread by aerosol are considered a more challenging enemy than those that require direct body-to-body contact for transmission, due to the potential for infection of numerous people rather than a single individual. Additionally, disease containment is much more difficult to achieve for aerosolized viral pathogens than for pathogens that spread solely via direct person-to-person contact. Thus, aerobiology has become an increasingly necessary component for studying viral pathogens that are naturally or intentionally transmitted by aerosol. The goal of studying aerosol viral pathogens is to improve public health preparedness and medical countermeasure development. Here, we provide a brief overview of the animal biosafety level 4 Aerobiology Core at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland, USA.REFERENCE:
Lackemeyer MG, Kok-Mercado Fd, Wada J, Bollinger L, Kindrachuk J, Wahl-Jensen V, Kuhn JH, Jahrling PB. ABSL-4 Aerobiology Biosafety and Technology at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick. Viruses. 2014 Jan 7;6(1):137-50. doi: 10.3390/v6010137. PubMed PMID: 24402304.
viernes, 10 de enero de 2014
Synthetic biology and biosecurity. From low levels of awareness to a comprehensive strategy
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| Photo: Mashable |
REFERENCE:
Kelle A. Synthetic biology and biosecurity. From low levels of awareness to a comprehensive strategy. EMBO Rep. 2009 Aug;10 Suppl 1:S23-7.
martes, 7 de enero de 2014
Containing the accidental laboratory escape of potential pandemic influenza viruses.
Abstract
BACKGROUND:
The recent work on the modified H5N1 has stirred an intense debate on the risk associated with the accidental release from biosafety laboratory of potential pandemic pathogens. Here, we assess the risk that the accidental escape of a novel transmissible influenza strain would not be contained in the local community.
METHODS:
We develop here a detailed agent-based model that specifically considers laboratory workers and their contacts in microsimulations of the epidemic onset. We consider the following non-pharmaceutical interventions: isolation of the laboratory, laboratory workers' household quarantine, contact tracing of cases and subsequent household quarantine of identified secondary cases, and school and workplace closure both preventive and reactive.
RESULTS:
Model simulations suggest that there is a non-negligible probability (5% to 15%), strongly dependent on reproduction number and probability of developing clinical symptoms, that the escape event is not detected at all. We find that the containment depends on the timely implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions and contact tracing and it may be effective (>90% probability per event) only for pathogens with moderate transmissibility (reproductive number no larger than R₀ = 1.5). Containment depends on population density and structure as well, with a probability of giving rise to a global event that is three to five times lower in rural areas.
CONCLUSIONS:
Results suggest that controllability of escape events is not guaranteed and, given the rapid increase of biosafety laboratories worldwide, this poses a serious threat to human health. Our findings may be relevant to policy makers when designing adequate preparedness plans and may have important implications for determining the location of new biosafety laboratories worldwide.
REFERENCE
BACKGROUND:
The recent work on the modified H5N1 has stirred an intense debate on the risk associated with the accidental release from biosafety laboratory of potential pandemic pathogens. Here, we assess the risk that the accidental escape of a novel transmissible influenza strain would not be contained in the local community.
METHODS:
We develop here a detailed agent-based model that specifically considers laboratory workers and their contacts in microsimulations of the epidemic onset. We consider the following non-pharmaceutical interventions: isolation of the laboratory, laboratory workers' household quarantine, contact tracing of cases and subsequent household quarantine of identified secondary cases, and school and workplace closure both preventive and reactive.
RESULTS:
Model simulations suggest that there is a non-negligible probability (5% to 15%), strongly dependent on reproduction number and probability of developing clinical symptoms, that the escape event is not detected at all. We find that the containment depends on the timely implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions and contact tracing and it may be effective (>90% probability per event) only for pathogens with moderate transmissibility (reproductive number no larger than R₀ = 1.5). Containment depends on population density and structure as well, with a probability of giving rise to a global event that is three to five times lower in rural areas.
CONCLUSIONS:
Results suggest that controllability of escape events is not guaranteed and, given the rapid increase of biosafety laboratories worldwide, this poses a serious threat to human health. Our findings may be relevant to policy makers when designing adequate preparedness plans and may have important implications for determining the location of new biosafety laboratories worldwide.
REFERENCE
1: Merler S, Ajelli M, Fumanelli L, Vespignani A. Containing the accidental laboratory escape of potential pandemic influenza viruses. BMC Med. 2013 Nov 28;11:252
Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols
Excerpt
Gene transfer research is a rapidly advancing field that involves the introduction of a genetic sequence into a human subject for research or diagnostic purposes. Clinical gene transfer trials are subject to regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at the federal level and to oversight by institutional review boards (IRBs) and institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) at the local level before human subjects can be enrolled. In addition, at present all researchers and institutions funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are required by NIH guidelines to submit human gene transfer protocols for advisory review by the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC). Some protocols are then selected for individual review and public discussion. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols provides an assessment of the state of existing gene transfer science and the current regulatory and policy context under which research is investigated. This report assesses whether the current oversight of individual gene transfer protocols by the RAC continues to be necessary and offers recommendations concerning the criteria the NIH should employ to determine whether individual protocols should receive public review. The focus of this report is on the standards the RAC and NIH should use in exercising its oversight function. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols will assist not only the RAC, but also research institutions and the general public with respect to utilizing and improving existing oversight processes.
REFERENCE:
National Research Council. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols: Assessing the Role of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2014.
Gene transfer research is a rapidly advancing field that involves the introduction of a genetic sequence into a human subject for research or diagnostic purposes. Clinical gene transfer trials are subject to regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at the federal level and to oversight by institutional review boards (IRBs) and institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) at the local level before human subjects can be enrolled. In addition, at present all researchers and institutions funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are required by NIH guidelines to submit human gene transfer protocols for advisory review by the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC). Some protocols are then selected for individual review and public discussion. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols provides an assessment of the state of existing gene transfer science and the current regulatory and policy context under which research is investigated. This report assesses whether the current oversight of individual gene transfer protocols by the RAC continues to be necessary and offers recommendations concerning the criteria the NIH should employ to determine whether individual protocols should receive public review. The focus of this report is on the standards the RAC and NIH should use in exercising its oversight function. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols will assist not only the RAC, but also research institutions and the general public with respect to utilizing and improving existing oversight processes.
REFERENCE:
National Research Council. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols: Assessing the Role of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2014.
martes, 31 de diciembre de 2013
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