VIDEO: BSL3 inspection for select agents #biosecurity #CDC

Este video, en inglés, sirve con fines educativos para instituciones o individuos quienes poseen, almacenan o transfieren microorganismos controlados (Select Agents) y toxinas en Estados Unidos. Este video puede ser utilizado en programas de entrenamiento para personal o como herramienta para programas de entrenamiento. Puedes ver y descargar este y otros videos en: SelectAgents.Gov

BSL3 Inspection

Toxins Inspection

#WHO Laboratory Assesment Tool

El "Laboratory Assessment" ofrece una guía para evaluar laboratorios y sistemas nacionales. La audiencia blanco es cualquier persona que evalúa laboratorios: autoridades nacionales de salud, agencias multilaterales, organizaciones no gubernamentales (NGO´s), resposables de laboratorio, etc. Este documento describe los procesos generales para evaluar laboratorios y proporciona dos cuestionarios que ayudan a evaluar los sistemas de laboratorios nacionales (anexo 1) y laboratorios individuales (anexo 2). Los evaluadores pueden utilizar los cuestionarios tal y como se presentan o acondicionar los materiales disponibles para que cumplan con requerimientos locales o específicos y adecuarlos mejor al contexto de evaluación. Los cuestionarios se encuentran en formato PDF y pueden ser fácilmente impresos, y en archivos Excel que permiten calculos matemáticos automáticos de indicadores cuando se responde a las preguntas y el análisis de datos. Pueden descargar el Archivo ZIP o descargar los archivos individuales.
Publication details:
Number of pages: 35
Publication date: 2012
Languages: English
WHO reference number: WHO/HSE/GCR/LYO/2012.2

Microbial aerosol generation during laboratory accidents

Aim: To quantify microbial aerosols generated by a series of laboratory accidents and to use these data in risk assessment.
Methods and Results: A series of laboratory accident scenarios have been devised and the microbial aerosol generated by them has been measured using a range of microbial air samplers. The accident scenarios generating the highest aerosol concentrations were, dropping a fungal plate, dropping a large bottle, centrifuge rotor leaks and a blocked syringe filter. Many of these accidents generated low particle size aerosols, which would be inhaled into the lungs of any exposed laboratory staff. Spray factors (SFs) have been calculated using the results of these experiments as an indicator of the potential for accidents to generate microbial aerosols. Model risk assessments have been described using the SF data.
Conclusions: Quantitative risk assessment of laboratory accidents can provide data that can aid the design of containment laboratories and the response to laboratory accidents.
Significance and Impact of the Study: A methodology has been described and supporting data provided to allow microbiological safety officers to carry out quantitative risk assessment of laboratory accidents.

A. Bennett & S. Parks. Microbial aerosol generation during laboratory accidents and subsequent risk assessment. Journal of Applied Microbiology 100 (2006) 658–663.

Donación de un libro

Tenemos 3 copias duras (libros impresos) del libro "Challenges and Opportunities for Education About Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences", donados por el National Research Council que pondremos obsequiar a las bibliotecas de 3 instituciones públicas, que tengan laboratorios de investigación biomédica. Para lo cual, solicitamos que nos envíen su solicitud, firmada y sellada, con el Vo.Bo. del bibliotecario de su institución al correo electrónico del
Este libro se encuentra disponible también en formato PDF.
Les daremos prioridad a las instituciones mexicanas, pero podrá tomarse en consideración la solicitud de algun país de habla hispana que desee contar con el libro.
Si quieres apoyar el programa "Dona un libro", por favor revisa las instrucciones.
El libro se enviará por correo regular, por lo que el libro lo recibirán a finales de Noviembre.

Biocontainment in Gain-of-Function Infectious Disease Research

The discussion of H5N1 influenza virus gain-of-function research has focused chiefly on its risk-to-benefit ratio. Another key component of risk is the level of containment employed. Work is more expensive and less efficient when pursued at biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) than at BSL-3 or at BSL-3 as modified for work with agricultural pathogens (BSL-3-Ag). However, here too a risk-to-benefit ratio analysis is applicable. BSL-4 procedures mandate daily inspection of facilities and equipment, monitoring of personnel for signs and symptoms of disease, and logs of dates and times that personnel, equipment, supplies, and samples enter and exit containment. These measures are not required at BSL-3 or BSL-3-Ag. Given the implications of inadvertent or deliberate release of high-threat pathogens with pandemic potential, it is imperative that the World Health Organization establish strict criteria for biocontainment that can be fairly applied in the developing world, as well as in more economically developed countries.
Lipkin WI. Biocontainment in Gain-of-Function Infectious Disease Research. MBio. 2012 Oct 9;3(5). pii: e00290-12. doi: 10.1128/mBio.00290-12. PMID: 23047747

Rethinking biosafety in research on potential pandemic pathogens

If accidentally released, mammalian-transmissible influenza A/H5N1 viruses could pose a greater threat to public health than possibly any other infectious agent currently under study in laboratories, because of such viruses' likely combination of transmissibility and virulence to humans. We advocate explicit risk-benefit assessments before work on such pathogens is permitted or funded, improvement of biosafety practices and enforcement, and harmonization of criteria for permitting such experiments across government agencies, as well as internationally. Such potential pandemic pathogens, as they have been called, jeopardize not only laboratory workers and their contacts, but also the wider population, who should be involved in assessments of when such risks are acceptable in the service of scientific knowledge that may itself bear major public health benefits.
Lipsitch M, Bloom BR. Rethinking biosafety in research on potential pandemic pathogens. MBio. 2012 Oct 9;3(5). pii: e00360-12. doi: 10.1128/mBio.00360-12. PMID: 23047752

Trends Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention


The potential dual use of life sciences knowledge, tools, and techniques reinforces the need for the scientific community to be aware of the norms of responsible and appropriate scientific conduct, as well as international and national legal requirements. Over the past decade, national and international scientific organizations having become increasingly engaged in issues related to the responsibilities of the scientific community to help reduce the risks of misuse of life sciences research (Bowman et al., 2011; IAP, 2005; NRC, 2004, 2006a, 2009a, c, 2011a; OECD, 2004; Royal Society and Wellcome Trust, 2004; WHO, 2005, 2007a). Scientists can also play a useful role in communicating with policy makers and civil society to help them understand the nature, applications, and potential positive and negative implications of developments in their field. Perspectives from the scientific community can contribute to discussions of how to create the best mix of policies and practices to achieve safety and security without unduly hampering global scientific progress for beneficial applications. This is the motivation and foundation for the workshop and the committee's report.
Trends Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention    PDF
National Research Council (US) Committee on Trends in Science and Technology Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention: An International Workshop.
Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2011.
ISBN-13: 978-0-309-21071-3
ISBN-10: 0-309-21071-2

EuroNHID Survey: Capabilities in 48 isolation facilities

BACKGROUND: Highly infectious diseases (HIDs) are defined as being transmissible from person to person, causing life-threatening illnesses and presenting a serious public health hazard. The sampling, handling and transport of specimens from patients with HIDs present specific bio-safety concerns.
FINDINGS: The European Network for HID project aimed to record, in a cross-sectional study, the infection control capabilities of referral centers for HIDs across Europe and assesses the level of achievement to previously published guidelines. In this paper, we report the current diagnostic capabilities and bio-safety measures applied to diagnostic procedures in these referral centers. Overall, 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries were evaluated. Although 81% of these referral centers are located near a biosafety level 3 laboratory, 11% and 31% of them still performed their microbiological and routine diagnostic analyses, respectively, without bio-safety measures.
CONCLUSIONS: The discrepancies among the referral centers surveyed between the level of practices and the European Network of Infectious Diseases (EUNID) recommendations have multiple reasons of which the interest of the individuals in charge and the investment they put in preparedness to emerging outbreaks. Despite the fact that the less prepared centers can improve by just updating their practice and policies any support to help them to achieve an acceptable level of biosecurity is welcome.
PMID: 23009598
REFERENCE: Thiberville SD, et. al. Diagnostic issues and capabilities in 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries: data from EuroNHID surveys. BMC Res Notes. 2012 Sep 25;5(1):527.