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miércoles, 31 de octubre de 2018

Corte de Agua 2018

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martes, 30 de octubre de 2018

#WebinarAMEXBIO: Conceptos básico sobre residuos peligrosos biológico infecciosos (RPBI's)




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lunes, 29 de octubre de 2018

Membresías AMEXBIO 2019

La Asociación Mexicana de Bioseguridad invita  a los miembros y no miembros, a inscribirse y pagar su cuota anual con descuento antes del 28 de diciembre de 2018.

CUOTAS 2019


  • Membresía 2019:  $1,100.- pesos MXN.
  • Pago anticipado de membresía 2019: $1,000.- pesos MXN (antes del 28 de Diciembre de 2018).

Si usted está retrasado en sus cuotas y desea recuperar su  membresía, pague adicionalmente la cuota de recuperación de: $300.- pesos MXN, y no se pierda los eventos del próximo año a tarifas preferenciales.

Información para transferencias, depósitos bancarios y facturación en la página http://amexbio.org/sibb/pagos/.

Toda la información sobre ingreso a nuevos miembros y cuotas en la página: http://amexbio.org/membresia/.

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martes, 23 de octubre de 2018

Promoting Scientific Transparency to Facilitate the Safe and Open International Exchange of Biological Materials and Electronic Data

Scientific communication, collaboration and progress are enhanced through the exchange of data, materials and ideas. Recent advances in technology, commercial proprietary discovery and current local and global events (e.g., emerging human, animal and plant disease outbreaks) have increased the demand, and shortened optimal timelines for material and data exchange, both domestically and internationally. Specific circumstances in each case, such as the type of material being transferred (i.e., select agent, disease-causing agent and assessed biosafety risk level) and current events, dictate the level of agreements and requirements. Recent lessons learned from emerging disease issues and emergencies have demonstrated that human engagement and increased science diplomacy are needed to reinforce and sustain biosafety and biosecurity practices and processes, for better scientific transparency. A reasonable and accepted framework of guidance for open sharing of data and materials is needed that can be applied on multiple cooperative levels, including global and national. Although numerous agreement variations already exist for the exchange of materials and data, regulations to guide the development of both the language and implementation of such agreements are limited. Without such regulations, scientific exchange is often restricted, limiting opportunities for international capacity building, collaboration and cooperation. In this article, we present and discuss several international case histories that illustrate the complex nature of scientific exchange. Recommendations are made for a dual bottom-up and top-down approach that includes all stakeholders from beginning negotiation stages to emphasize trust and cooperation. The broader aim of this approach is to increase international scientific transparency and trust in a safe and open manner, supporting increased global one health security.
REFERENCE:
Yeh KB, Monagin C, Fletcher J. Promoting Scientific Transparency to Facilitate the Safe and Open International Exchange of Biological Materials and Electronic Data. Trop Med Infect Dis. 2017 Oct 31;2(4). pii: E57. doi: 10.3390/tropicalmed2040057. PubMed PMID: 30270914; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC6082060.
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lunes, 22 de octubre de 2018

Bioterrorism and the Role of the Clinical Microbiology Laboratory

Regular review of the management of bioterrorism is essential for maintaining readiness for these sporadically occurring events. This review provides an overview of the history of biological disasters and bioterrorism. I also discuss the recent recategorization of tier 1 agents by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), and specific training and readiness processes and programs, such as the College of American Pathologists (CAP) Laboratory Preparedness Exercise (LPX). LPX examined the management of cultivable bacterial vaccine and attenuated strains of tier 1 agents or close mimics. In the LPX program, participating laboratories showed improvement in the level of diagnosis required and referral of isolates to an appropriate reference laboratory. Agents which proved difficult to manage in sentinel laboratories included the more fastidious Gram-negative organisms, especially Francisella tularensis and Burkholderia spp. The recent Ebola hemorrhagic fever epidemic provided a check on LRN safety processes. Specific guidelines and recommendations for laboratory safety and risk assessment in the clinical microbiology are explored so that sentinel laboratories can better prepare for the next biological disaster.
REFERENCE:
Wagar E. Bioterrorism and the Role of the Clinical Microbiology Laboratory. Clin Microbiol Rev. 2016 Jan;29(1):175-89. doi: 10.1128/CMR.00033-15. Review. PubMed PMID: 26656673; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC4771219.

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viernes, 19 de octubre de 2018

Synthetic viruses-Anything new?

[Fragment] The report of the construction of an infectious horsepox virus from synthesized DNA by Noyce, Lederman, and Evans [1] raised considerable concerns about whether this study will facilitate the construction of smallpox virus (variola) using synthetic biology [2–5]. This is a valid concern, but for a number of reasons—as explained below—no major change concerning the likelihood of a “resurrection” of smallpox emerges from this publication. Having said this, it is also evident that the scientific community, politicians, decision makers, and the lay public have to continue, and probably intensify, a discussion on benefits and risks of synthetic biology in a broader sense.
REFERENCE:
Thiel V. Synthetic viruses-Anything new? PLoS Pathog. 2018 Oct 4;14(10):e1007019. doi: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1007019. eCollection 2018 Oct. PubMed PMID: 30286176.

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jueves, 18 de octubre de 2018

A mobile biosafety microanalysis system for infectious agents

Biological threats posed by pathogens such as Ebola virus must be quickly diagnosed, while protecting the safety of personnel. Scanning electron microscopy and microanalysis requires minimal specimen preparation and can help to identify hazardous agents or substances. Here we report a compact biosafety system for rapid imaging and elemental analysis of specimens, including powders, viruses and bacteria, which is easily transportable to the site of an incident.
REFERENCE:
Beniac DR, Hiebert SL, Siemens CG, Corbett CR, Booth TF. A mobile biosafety microanalysis system for infectious agents. Sci Rep. 2015 Mar 30;5:9505. doi: 10.1038/srep09505. PubMed PMID: 25820944; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC4377622.
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miércoles, 17 de octubre de 2018

Smart Card Decontamination in a High-Containment Laboratory

The action of checking or proving the
validity or accuracy of something.
Validated procedures for decontamination of laboratory surfaces and equipment are essential to biosafety and biorisk programs at high-containment laboratories. Each high-containment laboratory contains a unique combination of surfaces, procedures, and biological agents that require decontamination methods tailored to specific facility practices. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is a high-containment laboratory operating multiple biosafety level (BSL)-3, ABSL-3, and BSL-3 Ag spaces. The PIADC facility requires the use of federally issued smart cards, called personal identity verification (PIV) cards, to access information technology (IT) networks both outside and within the high-containment laboratory. Because PIV cards may require transit from the BSL-3 to office spaces, a validated procedure for disinfecting PIV card surfaces prior to removal from the laboratory is critical to ensure biosafety and biosecurity. Two high-risk select agents used in the PIADC high-containment laboratory are foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) and swine vesicular disease virus (SVDV). We evaluated disinfection of PIV cards intentionally spotted with FMDV and SVDV using a modified quantitative carrier test and the liquid chemical disinfectant Virkon® S. Our experimental design modeled a worst-case scenario of PIV card contamination and disinfection by combining high concentrations of virus dried with an organic soil load and use of aged Virkon® S prepared in hard water. Results showed that FMDV and SVDV dried on PIV card surfaces were completely inactivated after immersion for 30 and 60 seconds, respectively, in a 5-day-old solution of 1% Virkon® S. Therefore, this study provided internal validation of PIADC biosafety protocols by demonstrating the efficacy of Virkon® S to inactivate viruses on contaminated smart cards at short contact times.
REFERENCE:
Gabbert, Lindsay R. et al. “Smart Card Decontamination in a High-Containment Laboratory.” Health Security 16.4 (2018): 244–251. PMC. Web. 1 Oct. 2018.


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martes, 16 de octubre de 2018

Biosafety controls come under fire

Experts call for a stronger safety culture at secure sites after incidents involving anthrax and flu in a US laboratory.
Recent accidents involving deadly pathogens at a leading laboratory in the United States highlight the need for a major global rethink of biosafety controls, experts say. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, reported two accidents involving anthrax and the deadly H5N1 influenza virus. Biosafety professionals argue that such incidents show that without a strong culture of biosafety, even highly secure facilities are susceptible to errors that could place workers and the public at risk.
REFERENCE:
NATURE NEWS 29 July 2014: Declan Butler. Biosafety controls come under fire. Nature 511, 515–516 (31 July 2014) doi:10.1038/511515a

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lunes, 15 de octubre de 2018

Laboratory-Acquired Vaccinia Virus Infection in a Recently Immunized Person — Massachusetts, 2013

On November 26, 2013, the CDC poxvirus laboratory was notified by the Boston Public Health Commission (BPHC) of an inadvertent inoculation of a recently vaccinated (ACAM2000 smallpox vaccine) laboratory worker with wild type vaccinia virus (VACV) Western Reserve. A joint investigation by CDC and BPHC confirmed orthopoxvirus infection in the worker, who had reported a needle stick in his thumb while inoculating a mouse with VACV. He experienced a non-tender, red rash on his arm, diagnosed at a local emergency department as cellulitis. He subsequently developed a necrotic lesion on his thumb, diagnosed as VACV infection. Three weeks after the injury, the thumb lesion was surgically debrided and at 2 months post-injury, the skin lesion had resolved. The investigation confirmed that the infection was the first reported VACV infection in the United States in a laboratory worker vaccinated according to the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations. The incident prompted the academic institution to outline biosafety measures for working with biologic agents, such as biosafety training of laboratory personnel, vaccination (if appropriate), and steps in incident reporting. Though vaccination has been shown to be an effective measure in protecting personnel in the laboratory setting, this case report underscores the importance of proper safety measures and incident reporting (1,2).
REFERENCE:
Hsu CH et al. Laboratory-Acquired Vaccinia Virus Infection in a Recently Immunized Person — Massachusetts, 2013. MMWR May 1, 2015 / 64(16);435-438

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domingo, 14 de octubre de 2018

Laboratory-associated infections and biosafety.

An estimated 500,000 laboratory workers in the United States are at risk of exposure to infectious agents that cause disease ranging from inapparent to life-threatening infections, but the precise risk to a given worker unknown. The emergence of human immunodeficiency virus and hantavirus, the continuing problem of hepatitis B virus, and the reemergence of Mycobacterium tuberculosis have renewed interest in biosafety for the employees of laboratories and health care facilities. This review examines the history, the causes, and the methods for prevention of laboratory-associated infections. The initial step in a biosafety program is the assessment of risk to the employee. Risk assessment guidelines include the pathogenicity of the infectious agent, the method of transmission, worker-related risk factors, the source and route of infection, and the design of the laboratory facility. Strategies for the prevention and management of laboratory-associated infections are based on the containment of the infectious agent by physical separation from the laboratory worker and the environment, employee education about the occupational risks, and availability of an employee health program. Adherence to the biosafety guidelines mandated or proposed by various governmental and accrediting agencies reduces the risk of an occupational exposure to infectious agents handled in the workplace.
REFERENCE:
Sewell DL. Laboratory-associated infections and biosafety. Clin Microbiol Rev. 1995 Jul;8(3):389-405. Review. PubMed PMID: 7553572; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC174631.

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sábado, 13 de octubre de 2018

Evidence-Based Biosafety

We examined the available evidence on the effectiveness of measures aimed at protecting humans and the environment against the risks of working with genetically modified microorganisms (GMOs) and with non-GMO pathogenic microorganisms. A few principles and methods underlie the current biosafety practice: risk assessment, biological containment, concentration and enclosure, exposure minimization, physical containment, and hazard minimization. Many of the current practices are based on experience and expert judgment. The effectiveness of biosafety measures may be evaluated at the level of single containment equipment items and procedures, at the level of the laboratory as a whole, or at the clinical-epidemiological level. Data on the containment effectiveness of equipment and laboratories are scarce and fragmented. Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are therefore important for evaluating the effectiveness of biosafety. For the majority of LAIs there appears to be no direct cause, suggesting that failures of biosafety were not noticed or that containment may have been insufficient. The number of reported laboratory accidents associated with GMOs is substantially lower than that of those associated with non-GMOs. It is unknown to what extent specific measures contribute to the overall level of biosafety. We therefore recommend that the evidence base of biosafety practice be strengthened.
REFERENCE:
Kimman TG, Smit E, Klein MR. Evidence-based biosafety: a review of the principles and effectiveness of microbiological containment measures. Clin Microbiol Rev. 2008 Jul;21(3):403-25. doi: 10.1128/CMR.00014-08. Review. PubMed. PMID: 18625678
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viernes, 12 de octubre de 2018

Antibiotics, #Resistome and Resistance Mechanisms: A Bacterial Perspective

History of mankind is regarded as struggle against infectious diseases. Rather than observing the withering away of bacterial diseases, antibiotic resistance has emerged as a serious global health concern. Medium of antibiotic resistance in bacteria varies greatly and comprises of target protection, target substitution, antibiotic detoxification and block of intracellular antibiotic accumulation. Further aggravation to prevailing situation arose on observing bacteria gradually becoming resistant to different classes of antibiotics through acquisition of resistance genes from same and different genera of bacteria. Attributing bacteria with feature of better adaptability, dispersal of antibiotic resistance genes to minimize effects of antibiotics by various means including horizontal gene transfer (conjugation, transformation, and transduction), Mobile genetic elements (plasmids, transposons, insertion sequences, integrons, and integrative-conjugative elements) and bacterial toxin-antitoxin system led to speedy bloom of antibiotic resistance amongst bacteria. Proficiency of bacteria to obtain resistance genes generated an unpleasant situation; a grave, but a lot unacknowledged, feature of resistance gene transfer.
REFERENCE:
Sultan I, et al. Antibiotics, Resistome and Resistance Mechanisms: A Bacterial Perspective. Front Microbiol. 2018 Sep 21;9:2066.

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miércoles, 10 de octubre de 2018

Cabinas de seguridad biológica: Uso, desinfección y mantenimiento

Las cabinas de seguridad biológica (CSB), comúnmente conocidas como cabinas de bioseguridad, forman parte de un grupo de equipos destinados a mejorar las condiciones generales bajo las cuales se realizan una gran variedad de actividades en los laboratorios clínicos y de investigación en el área de salud pública. Estas actividades abarcan desde procesos rutinarios para la identificación de microorganismos hasta actividades especializadas de investigación. Así mismo, son igualmente conocidas con diversos nombres tales como “gabinetes de bioseguridad”, “campanas de flujo laminar” y “purificadores”, entre otros, el término “flujo laminar” se utiliza también comúnmente para identificarlas. Los equipos son los que garantizan la existencia de ambientes controlados, indispensables para realizar actividades que por sus características resultan potencialmente peligrosas para la salud del hombre y del ambiente. Por otra parte, algunas de las cabinas protegen el estado de los productos o cultivos objeto de la investigación.

REFERENCIA
Cabinas de seguridad biológica: Uso, desinfección y mantenimiento, WHO 2002. 1ª Ed.
ISBN 92 75 32416 6

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martes, 9 de octubre de 2018

The basics of animal biosafety and biocontainment training

The threat of biocontamination in an animal facility is best subdued by training. 'Training' is an ambiguous designation that may not be adequately appreciated in all animal facilities. The authors set down concrete training topics and provide practical advice on incorporating the basic principles of facility biosafety training--as well as the precautions and procedures that employees must know in case of accident or emergency--into various training models. They also discuss the current biosafety publications and guidelines and their relationship to biosafety training.

REFERENCE:
Pritt S, Hankenson FC, Wagner T, Tate M. The basics of animal biosafety and biocontainment training. Lab Anim (NY). 2007 Jun;36(6):31-8. PubMed PMID: 17519943.

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lunes, 8 de octubre de 2018

Chemical Use in Animal Models


Institutional health and safety programs are responsible for minimizing personnel risk in working with animals that have been administered hazardous chemicals. Regulations and associated guidance are lacking in specific processes for managing these animals. A chemical control banding system categorizes chemicals into bands where each band level is associated with specific control practices. This article describes a general approach to the engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment practices for developing an animal chemical control banding system. An internal committee should be responsible for conducting the risk assessments to assign chemicals used in animals into band levels, with many factors and resources included to facilitate in this process. The authors provide examples from their home institution where an animal chemical banding system was implemented. Institutions can use this information when designing their own programs, which will likely be unique in consideration of their specific needs and resources.
REFERENCE:
Vanessa K. Lee, Leslie M. Hubble, and Scott W. Thomaston. Chemical Use in Animal Models. Applied Biosafety Vol 23, Issue 3, pp. 153 - 161

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viernes, 5 de octubre de 2018

Zoonotic Infections from Hantavirus and Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis Virus (LCMV) Associated with Rodent Colonies That Were Not Experimentally Infected

The risk assessment for research involving rodents housed in colonies must include the potential for transmission of Hantavirus and lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV). Various zoonotic strains of Hantavirus are present at varying levels in wild rodent reservoirs around the world; LCMV infects a percentage of the common house mouse population. The infection in rodents for these viruses is generally inapparent, and transmission of both viruses to staff working with the rodents is documented in the literature. Exposure to aerosolized feces, urine, nesting material dust, or bites from an infected rodent can transmit the virus to both the staff and the uninfected rodents in the colony. Infection can also be spread to rodents from implantation of cells passaged in infected rodents, since both viruses retain infectivity during storage of infected cells in liquid nitrogen. This literature survey of occupational infections with Hantavirus and LCMV arising from work with rodent colonies is offered to increase understanding of 4 elements of AAALAC International requirements for rodent colony management: pest control, verification of pathogen status prior to import of rodents, health monitoring of rodent colonies, and pathogen testing of rodent-derived biologicals used in animal protocols. Although published case studies do not provide statistical data, the cases presented here illustrate the importance of adhering to rigorous colony management programs. The pet industry in the United States does not follow these critical standards, as evidenced by the outbreak of Seoul virus, a strain of Hantavirus, in 2018 and a larger outbreak of LCMV virus that occurred in 2012.
REFERENCE:
Karen B. Byers. Zoonotic Infections from Hantavirus and Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis Virus (LCMV) Associated with Rodent Colonies That Were Not Experimentally Infected. Applied Biosafety Vol 23, Issue 3, pp. 143 - 152
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jueves, 4 de octubre de 2018

Animal Research Biosafety

The use of laboratory animals as experimental models of disease has been a critical tool for biomedical researchers for decades. Animal studies allow scientists to discover and understand the mechanism of infection and ultimately to develop effective treatment and prevention modalities. Workers who directly handle infectious microbes or infected laboratory animals are at risk of exposure while performing their assigned duties. A comprehensive biosafety program, led by a biosafety professional, is critical to properly protect workers and the surrounding community. Such a program includes a thorough understanding of the biohazard through formal risk assessment, implementation of effective biohazard controls, and extensive training of all personnel who are at risk of exposure.
REFERENCE:
T. Scott Alderman, Calvin B. Carpenter, and Rebecca McGirr. Animal Research Biosafety. Applied Biosafety Vol 23, Issue 3, pp. 130 - 142

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miércoles, 3 de octubre de 2018

Institutional Responsibilities for the Oversight of Personnel Safety in Animal Research

Research programs utilizing animal models present a wide variety of risks to personnel safety. These risks stem from a range of hazards including well-recognized physical, chemical, or infectious hazards to novel or less-well defined hazards associated with new and emerging technologies. Institutions must provide appropriate oversight of occupational health and safety programs to help prevent and recognize personnel injury or illness. In this article, we review institutional responsibilities pertaining to animal research safety programs including their regulatory basis and practices necessary for their effective oversight.

REFERENCES:


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martes, 2 de octubre de 2018

High Containment Pathogen Preparation in the Intensive Care Unit

The recent Ebola virus disease outbreak highlighted the need to build national and worldwide capacity to provide care for patients with highly infectious diseases. Specialized biocontainment units were successful in treating a number of critically ill patients with Ebola virus disease both in the United States and Europe. Several key principles underlie the care of critically ill patients in a high containment environment. Environmental factors, staffing, equipment, training, laboratory testing, procedures and waste management each present unique challenges. A multidisciplinary approach is key to developing effective systems and protocols to maintain the safety of patients, staff and communities.
REFERENCE:
Garibaldi, Brian T., and Daniel S. Chertow. “High Containment Pathogen Preparation in the Intensive Care Unit.” Infectious disease clinics of North America 31.3 (2017): 561–576. PMC. Web. 1 Oct. 2018.


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lunes, 1 de octubre de 2018

A Review of Laboratory-Acquired Infections in the Asia-Pacific

A rapid review was performed to determine (1) the number and causes of reported laboratory-acquired infections (LAI) in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) their significance and threat to the community; (3) the primary risk factors associated with LAIs; (4) the consequences in the event of a LAI or pathogen escape; and (5) to make general recommendations regarding biosafety practices for diagnosis and research in the Asia-Pacific region. A search for LAI and zoonoses in the Asia-Pacific region using online search engines revealed a relatively low number of reports. Only 27 LAI reports were published between 1982 and 2016. The most common pathogens associated with LAIs were dengue virus, Arthroderma spp., Brucella spp., Mycobacterium spp., Rickettsia spp., and Shigella spp. Seventy-eight percent (21 out of 27 LAI reports) occurred in high-income countries (i.e., Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) where laboratories were likely to comply with international biosafety standards. Two upper-middle income countries (China (2), and Malaysia (2)) and one lower-middle income country (India (2)) reported LAI incidents. The majority of the reports (fifty-two percent (14/27)) of LAIs occurred in research laboratories. Five LAI reports were from clinical or diagnostic laboratories that are considered at the frontier for zoonotic disease detection. Governments and laboratories in the Asia-Pacific region should be encouraged to report LAI cases as it provides a useful tool to monitor unintended release of zoonotic pathogens and to further improve laboratory biosafety. Non-reporting of LAI events could pose a risk of disease transmission from infected laboratory staff to communities and the environment. The international community has an important and continuing role to play in supporting laboratories in the Asia-Pacific region to ensure that they maintain the safe working environment for the staff and their families, and the wider community.
REFERENCE:
Siengsanan-Lamont, Jarunee, and Stuart D. Blacksell. “A Review of Laboratory-Acquired Infections in the Asia-Pacific: Understanding Risk and the Need for Improved Biosafety for Veterinary and Zoonotic Diseases.” Tropical Medicine and Infectious Disease 3.2 (2018): 36. PMC. Web. 1 Oct. 2018.

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