lunes, 24 de abril de 2017

LIBRO: Prevención de las infecciones nosocomiales, 2a edicíon, Guía práctica


Prevencíon de las infecciones nosocomiales, 2a edicíon, Guía práctica Prevention of hospital-acquired infections, 2nd edition. A practical guide
Índice Contents
Introducción Introduction
Capítulo I. Epidemiología de las infecciones nosocomiales Chapter I. Epidemiology of nosocomial infections
Capítulo II. Programas de control de infecciones Chapter II. Infection control programmes
Capítulo III. Vigilancia de las infecciones nosocomiales Chapter III. Nosocomial infection surveillance
Capítulo IV. Forma de abordar los brotes Chapter IV. dealing with outbreaks
Capítulo V. Prevención de las infecciones nosocomiales  Chapter V. Prevention of nosocomial infections
Capítulo VI. Prevención de las infecciones nosocomiales endémicas comunes Chapter VI. Prevention of common endemic nosocomial infections
Capítulo VII. Precauciones para el control de infecciones durante la atencíon del paciente Chapter VII. Infection control precautiopns in patient care 
Capítulo VIII. Medio ambiente Chapter VIII. Environment
Capítulo IX. Uso de antimicrobianos y farmacorresistencia Chapter IX. Antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistance
Capítulo X. Prevención de infecciones del personal Chapter X. Preventing infections of staff
Anexo 1. Lecturas recomendadas Annex 1. Suggested further reading
Anexo 2. Recursos disponibles en Internet Annex 2. Internet resources
DESCARGAR ESPAÑOL DOWNLOAD ENGLISH

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lunes, 17 de abril de 2017

Xenotropic retrovirus Bxv1 in human pancreatic β cell lines

It has been reported that endogenous retroviruses can contaminate human cell lines that have been passaged as xenotransplants in immunocompromised mice. We previously developed and described 2 human pancreatic β cell lines (EndoC-βH1 and EndoC-βH2) that were generated in this way. Here, we have shown that B10 xenotropic virus 1 (Bxv1), a xenotropic endogenous murine leukemia virus (MuLV), is present in these 2 recently described cell lines. We determined that Bxv1 was also present in SCID mice that were used for in vivo propagation of EndoC-βH1/2 cells, suggesting that contamination occurred during xenotransplantation. EndoC-βH1/2 cells released Bxv1 particles that propagated to human 293T and Mus dunni cells. Mobilization assays demonstrated that Bxv1 transcomplements defective MuLV-based retrovectors. In contrast, common rodent β cell lines, rat INS-1E and RIN-5F cells and mouse MIN6 and βTC3 cells, displayed either no or extremely weak xenotropic helper activity toward MuLV-based retrovectors, although xenotropic retrovirus sequences and transcripts were detected in both mouse cell lines. Bxv1 propagation from EndoC-βH1/2 to 293T cells occurred only under optimized conditions and was overall poorly efficient. Thus, although our data imply that MuLV-based retrovectors should be cautiously used in EndoC-βH1/2 cells, our results indicate that an involuntary propagation of Bxv1 from these cells can be easily avoided with good laboratory practices.
REFERENCE:
Kirkegaard JS, et al. Xenotropic retrovirus Bxv1 in human pancreatic β cell lines. J Clin Invest. 2016 Mar 1;126(3):1109-13.

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lunes, 10 de abril de 2017

Use and misuse of material transfer agreements: lessons in proportionality from research, repositories, and litigation

Material transfer agreements exist to facilitate the exchange of materials and associated data between researchers as well as to protect the interests of the researchers and their institutions. But this dual mandate can be a source of frustration for researchers, creating administrative burdens and slowing down collaborations. We argue here that in most cases in pre-competitive research, a simple agreement would suffice; the more complex agreements and mechanisms for their negotiation should be reserved for cases where the risks posed to the institution and the potential commercial value of the research reagents is high.

REFERENCE:
Bubela T, Guebert J, Mishra A. Use and misuse of material transfer agreements: lessons in proportionality from research, repositories, and litigation. PLoS Biol. 2015 Feb 3;13(2):e1002060.

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lunes, 3 de abril de 2017

Virus contaminations of cell cultures – A biotechnological view


In contrast to contamination by microbes and mycoplasma, which can be relatively easily detected, viral contamination present a serious threat because of the difficulty in detecting some viruses and the lack of effective methods of treating infected cell cultures. While some viruses are capable of causing morphological changes to infected cells (e.g. cytopathic effect)which are detectable by microscopy some viral contaminations result in the integration of the viral genome as provirus, this causes no visual evidence, by means of modification of the cellular morphology. Virus production from such cell lines, are potentially dangerous for other cell cultures (in research labs)by cross contaminations, or for operators and patients (in the case of the production of injectable biologicals) because of potential infection. The only way to keep cell cultures for research, development, and the biotech industry virus-free is the prevention of such contaminations. Cell cultures can become contaminated by the following means: firstly, they may already be contaminated as primary cultures (because the source of the cells was already infected), secondly, they were contaminated due to the use of contaminated raw materials, or thirdly, they were contaminated via an animal passage. This overview describes the problems and risks associated with viral contaminations in animal cell culture, describes the origins of these contaminations as well as the most important virsuses associated with viral contaminations in cell culture. In addition, ways to prevent viral contaminations as well as measures undertaken to avoid and assess risks for viral contaminations as performed in the biotech industry are briefly described.
REFERENCE:
Merten, O.-W. “Virus Contaminations of Cell Cultures – A Biotechnological View.” Cytotechnology 39.2 (2002): 91–116. PMC. Web. 3 Apr. 2017.

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Material Transfer Agreements: A University Perspective

Fragment:
Scientists have traditionally shared research materials freely, and indeed an important criterion for scientific publication has been the unfettered ability of other researchers to experimentally reproduce and thereby test published results. That ability to replicate results will often rely on access to the underlying biological materials or information, but that access is not assured today. So what has changed? Probably the most significant factor has been the narrowing of the gap between fundamental research and commercial developments, particularly in the biomedical arena, but it is also evident in agricultural biology (Rai and Eisenberg, 2001). Materials that at one time would have been useful almost exclusively for fundamental research purposes are increasingly seen as having direct commercial value, and this has generated a new breed of company that focuses on leveraging novel research tools to discover new commercially valuable traits, genes, or compounds. Naturally, these companies are reluctant to share their “crown jewels” without making sure that their business interests are protected. Also of significance has been the changing role of universities, which are today actively using the patent system as a means of transferring its research results into the private sector and often conduct research that is sponsored by private companies.

REFERENCE:
Streitz, Wendy D., and Alan B. Bennett. “Material Transfer Agreements: A University Perspective.” Plant Physiology 133.1 (2003): 10–13. PMC. Web. 30 Mar. 2017.
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lunes, 27 de marzo de 2017

Infección de felinos con influenza H5N1

Existen varios reportes de infecciones de felinos con influenza H5N1. Este virus fué capaz de infectar gatos domésticos, tigres, leopardos, y leones. En todos los casos los felinos se cree que se infectaron por el consumo de carne de aves crudas, y que estaban contaminadas con influenza, ingresando a través de la tráquea. En todos los casos, los felinos tuvieron problemas respiratorios, fiebre y murieron poco después. La confirmación de la infección se realizó mediante pruebas moleculares que identificaron la cepa de influenza con el que enfermaron. Los casos reportados de infección por influenza en gatos domésticos son mas comunes, pero los casos documentados de felinos en vida salvaje son raros.

REFERENCIAS:
Kuiken T, et al. Avian H5N1 influenza in cats. Science. 2004 Oct 8;306(5694):241.
Keawcharoen, Juthatip et al. “Avian Influenza H5N1 in Tigers and Leopards.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 10.12 (2004): 2189–2191.
Chen, Quanjiao et al. “First Documented Case of Avian Influenza (H5N1) Virus Infection in a Lion.” Emerging Microbes & Infections 5.12 (2016): e125–.
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martes, 21 de marzo de 2017

Convocatoria Trabajos Libres #SIBB17

Ya se encuentra abierta la convocatoria para el envío de resúmenes para el 9º Simposio de Bioseguridad y Biocustodia, que se llevará a cabo en el Laboratorio Estatal de Salud Pública de Michoacán (LESPM), de Junio 7 al 10, 2017 en la ciudad de Morelia, Michoacán. Para más detalles en relación al formato y forma de envío, revisar la siguiente página electrónica: https://amexbio.wildapricot.org/TrabajosLibres


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lunes, 20 de marzo de 2017

Responsible life sciences research for global health security

Advances in life sciences research are inextricably linked to improvements in human, plant and animal health. Promotion of excellent, high-quality life sciences research that is conducted responsibly, safely and securely can foster global health security and contribute to economic development, evidence-informed policy making, public trust and confidence in science. Yet opportunities may also be accompanied by risks that need to be acknowledged and addressed. The risks under consideration in this guidance are those associated with accidents, with research that may pose unexpected risks and with the potential deliberate misuse of life sciences research. The opportunities offered by the life sciences are too important for governments and the scientific community (including individual researchers, laboratory managers, research institutions, professional associations, etc.) to leave the attendant risks unaddressed.
The purpose of this guidance is to inform about the risks posed by accidents or the potential deliberate misuse of life sciences research and to propose measures to minimize these risks within the context of promoting and harnessing the power of the life sciences to improve health for all people. Although the issues addressed in this document can potentially interest a quite large audience, the proposed measures and the selfassessment questionnaire are of a public health nature. Health researchers, laboratory managers and research institutions are therefore the primary audience of this guidance.

REFERENCE:
Responsible life sciences researchfor global health security. A guidance document
Publication details
Publication date: 2010
Languages: English
WHO reference number: WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2010.2
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lunes, 13 de marzo de 2017

Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks

Routes to biological containment
Biocontainment comprises any strategy applied to ensure that harmful organisms are confined to controlled laboratory conditions and not allowed to escape into the environment. Genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs), regardless of the nature of the modification and how it was established, have potential human or ecological impact if accidentally leaked or voluntarily released into a natural setting. Although all evidence to date is that GEMs are unable to compete in the environment, the power of synthetic biology to rewrite life requires a pre-emptive strategy to tackle possible unknown risks. Physical containment barriers have proven effective but a number of strategies have been developed to further strengthen biocontainment. Research on complex genetic circuits, lethal genes, alternative nucleic acids, genome recoding and synthetic auxotrophies aim to design more effective routes towards biocontainment. Here, we describe recent advances in synthetic biology that contribute to the ongoing efforts to develop new and improved genetic, semantic, metabolic and mechanistic plans for the containment of GEMs.

REFERENCE:
Torres, Leticia et al. “Synthetic Biology Approaches to Biological Containment: Pre-Emptively Tackling Potential Risks.” Ed. Vitor B. Pinheiro. Essays in Biochemistry 60.4 (2016): 393–410. PMC. Web. 8 Feb. 2017.
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