#VIDEOS: Toma de muestras para diagnóstico de #influenza #EPP #Transporte




Curso: Capacitación en prevención de infecciones respiratorias #Influenza

Cómo utilizar los módulos de capacitación
Los módulos de capacitación están divididos en 6 presentaciones, complementarias más independientes. Se espera que el comité de control de infecciones o equipo responsable por educación del personal en salud utilicen estas presentaciones para la actualización del personal de salud y comunidad en el tema de medidas de prevención y control de infecciones con enfoque en las enfermedades respiratorias.
Se sugiere también que antes y después de la capacitación los participantes sean evaluados con la "Evaluación de la capacitación" para que se pueda saber cuál es el impacto de la capacitación en el conocimiento del personal de salud sobre el tema.
Curso: Capacitación en prevención de infecciones en los servicios de salud con enfoque en las enfermedades respiratorias

Tuberculosis Laboratory #Biosafety Manual

Laboratory biosafety is the process of applying a combination of administrative controls, containment principles, practices and procedures, safety equipment, emergency preparedness, and facilities to enable laboratory staff to work safely with potentially infectious microorganisms; biosafety also aims at preventing unintentional exposure to pathogens or their accidental release. This manual describes the minimum biosafety measures that should be implemented at the different levels of tuberculosis (TB) testing laboratories to reduce the risk of a laboratory-acquired infection.
1. Risk assessment and the classification of TB laboratories
2. Essential biosafety measures for TB laboratories
3. Low-risk TB laboratories
4. Moderate-risk TB laboratories
5. High-risk TB laboratories (TB-containment laboratories)
6. Safety equipment
7. Personal protective equipment and clothing
8. Plans for emergency preparedness and response
9. References

Tuberculosis Laboratory Biosafety Manual
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2012.
ISBN-13: 978-92-4-150463-8
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PDF version of this title (929K)

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Este año 2014, festejamos el quinto aniversario de la Asociación Mexicana de Bioseguridad A.C.

VI Simposio Internacional de Bioseguridad y Biocustodia
4 - 7 junio 2014
Monterrey, Nuevo León, México
Invitan: Asociación Mexicana de Bioseguridad y Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.

ABSL-4 Aerobiology Biosafety and Technology...

The overall threat of a viral pathogen to human populations is largely determined by the modus operandi and velocity of the pathogen that is transmitted among humans. Microorganisms that can spread by aerosol are considered a more challenging enemy than those that require direct body-to-body contact for transmission, due to the potential for infection of numerous people rather than a single individual. Additionally, disease containment is much more difficult to achieve for aerosolized viral pathogens than for pathogens that spread solely via direct person-to-person contact. Thus, aerobiology has become an increasingly necessary component for studying viral pathogens that are naturally or intentionally transmitted by aerosol. The goal of studying aerosol viral pathogens is to improve public health preparedness and medical countermeasure development. Here, we provide a brief overview of the animal biosafety level 4 Aerobiology Core at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland, USA.
Lackemeyer MG, Kok-Mercado Fd, Wada J, Bollinger L, Kindrachuk J, Wahl-Jensen V, Kuhn JH, Jahrling PB. ABSL-4 Aerobiology Biosafety and Technology at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick. Viruses. 2014 Jan 7;6(1):137-50. doi: 10.3390/v6010137. PubMed PMID: 24402304.

Synthetic biology and biosecurity. From low levels of awareness to a comprehensive strategy

Photo: Mashable
Synthetic biology has become one of the most dynamic research fields in the life sciences. In reality, though, the term is used to cover a host of different approaches rather than a single defined discipline; these range from the large-scale assembly of DNA segments to the development of new tools and technology platforms, and to the search for the minimal cell and the origins of life. The evolution of the field has also been accompanied by the recognition that the concomitant shift in biology from a descriptive to a predictive science, and the technologies that will ensue, bring with them a range of potential societal implications and dangers.
Kelle A. Synthetic biology and biosecurity. From low levels of awareness to a comprehensive strategy. EMBO Rep. 2009 Aug;10 Suppl 1:S23-7.

Containing the accidental laboratory escape of potential pandemic influenza viruses.

The recent work on the modified H5N1 has stirred an intense debate on the risk associated with the accidental release from biosafety laboratory of potential pandemic pathogens. Here, we assess the risk that the accidental escape of a novel transmissible influenza strain would not be contained in the local community.
We develop here a detailed agent-based model that specifically considers laboratory workers and their contacts in microsimulations of the epidemic onset. We consider the following non-pharmaceutical interventions: isolation of the laboratory, laboratory workers' household quarantine, contact tracing of cases and subsequent household quarantine of identified secondary cases, and school and workplace closure both preventive and reactive.
Model simulations suggest that there is a non-negligible probability (5% to 15%), strongly dependent on reproduction number and probability of developing clinical symptoms, that the escape event is not detected at all. We find that the containment depends on the timely implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions and contact tracing and it may be effective (>90% probability per event) only for pathogens with moderate transmissibility (reproductive number no larger than R₀ = 1.5). Containment depends on population density and structure as well, with a probability of giving rise to a global event that is three to five times lower in rural areas.
Results suggest that controllability of escape events is not guaranteed and, given the rapid increase of biosafety laboratories worldwide, this poses a serious threat to human health. Our findings may be relevant to policy makers when designing adequate preparedness plans and may have important implications for determining the location of new biosafety laboratories worldwide.

1: Merler S, Ajelli M, Fumanelli L, Vespignani A. Containing the accidental laboratory escape of potential pandemic influenza viruses. BMC Med. 2013 Nov

Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols

Gene transfer research is a rapidly advancing field that involves the introduction of a genetic sequence into a human subject for research or diagnostic purposes. Clinical gene transfer trials are subject to regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at the federal level and to oversight by institutional review boards (IRBs) and institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) at the local level before human subjects can be enrolled. In addition, at present all researchers and institutions funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are required by NIH guidelines to submit human gene transfer protocols for advisory review by the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC). Some protocols are then selected for individual review and public discussion. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols provides an assessment of the state of existing gene transfer science and the current regulatory and policy context under which research is investigated. This report assesses whether the current oversight of individual gene transfer protocols by the RAC continues to be necessary and offers recommendations concerning the criteria the NIH should employ to determine whether individual protocols should receive public review. The focus of this report is on the standards the RAC and NIH should use in exercising its oversight function. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols will assist not only the RAC, but also research institutions and the general public with respect to utilizing and improving existing oversight processes.
National Research Council. Oversight and Review of Clinical Gene Transfer Protocols: Assessing the Role of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2014.