WHO Guidelines for Containment of Poliovirus Following Type-Specific #Polio Eradication

In 1988, the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) resolved to eradicate polio worldwide. Among the three wild poliovirus (WPV) types (type 1, type 2, and type 3), WPV type 2 (WPV2) has been eliminated in the wild since 1999, and WPV type 3 (WPV3) has not been reported since 2012. In 2015, only Afghanistan and Pakistan have reported WPV transmission. On May 25, 2015, all WHO Member States endorsed World Health Assembly resolution 68.3 on full implementation of the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 (the Endgame Plan), and with it, the third Global Action Plan to minimize poliovirus facility-associated risk (GAPIII). All WHO Member States have committed to implementing appropriate containment of WPV2 in essential laboratory and vaccine production facilities* by the end of 2015 and of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) within 3 months of global withdrawal of OPV2, which is planned for April 2016. This report summarizes critical steps for essential laboratory and vaccine production facilities that intend to retain materials confirmed to contain or potentially containing type-specific WPV, vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV), or OPV/Sabin viruses, and steps for nonessential facilities† that process specimens that contain or might contain polioviruses. National authorities will need to certify that the essential facilities they host meet the containment requirements described in GAPIII. After certification of WPV eradication, the use of all OPV will cease; final containment of all polioviruses after polio eradication and OPV cessation will minimize the risk for reintroduction of poliovirus into a polio-free world.

REFERENCE:
Previsani N, Tangermann RH, Tallis G, Jafari HS. World Health Organization Guidelines for Containment of Poliovirus Following Type-Specific Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2015. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2015 Aug 28;64(33):913-7.

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MERS-CoV in Upper Respiratory Tract and Lungs of Dromedary Camels, Saudi Arabia, 2013-2014

To assess the temporal dynamics of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in dromedary camels, specimens were collected at 1-2 month intervals from 2 independent groups of animals during April 2013-May 2014 in Al-Ahsa Province, Saudi Arabia, and tested for MERS-CoV RNA by reverse transcription PCR. Of 96 live camels, 28 (29.2%) nasal swab samples were positive; of 91 camel carcasses, 56 (61.5%) lung tissue samples were positive. Positive samples were more commonly found among young animals (<4 years of age) than adults (>4 years of age). The proportions of positive samples varied by month for both groups; detection peaked during November 2013 and January 2014 and declined in March and May 2014. These findings further our understanding of MERS-CoV infection in dromedary camels and may help inform intervention strategies to reduce zoonotic infections.

 REFERENCE: 

Khalafalla AI, Lu X, Al-Mubarak AI, Dalab AH, Al-Busadah KA, Erdman DD. MERS-CoV in Upper Respiratory Tract and Lungs of Dromedary Camels, Saudi Arabia, 2013-2014. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015 Jul;21(7):1153-8. 

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Probable Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus transmission occurred after aerosol-generating medical procedures in Russia: nosocomial cluster

We report here a fatal case of laboratory confirmed Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF), which caused nosocomial infection in eight health care workers (HCWs), who had provided medical care for the patient. All the HCWs survived. The report demonstrates that airborne transmission of CCHF is a real risk, at least when the CCHF patient is in a ventilator. During performance of any aerosol-generating medical procedures for any CCHF patient airborne precautions should always be added to standard precautions, in particular, airway protective N95 mask or equivalent standard, eye protection, single airborne precaution room, or a well-ventilated setting.
REFERENCE:
Pshenichnaya NY, Nenadskaya SA. Probable Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus transmission occurred after aerosol-generating medical procedures in Russia: nosocomial cluster. Int J Infect Dis. 2015 Apr;33:120-2.
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Transmisión de arbovirus (flavivirus) sin necesidad de vectores biológicos

Hay que recordar que quienes trabajan con virus como dengue, virus del Oeste del Nilo, fiebre amarilla pueden adquirir la infección en el laboratorio, SIN necesidad de vectores biológicos.



http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228656801_Non-vector_transmission_of_dengue_and_other_mosquito-borne_flaviviruses

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BSL-3 Laboratory Practices in the United States: Comparison of Select Agent and Non–Select Agent Facilities

New construction of biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories in the United States has increased in the past decade to facilitate research on potential bioterrorism agents. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention inspect BSL-3 facilities and review commissioning documentation, but no single agency has oversight over all BSL-3 facilities. This article explores the extent to which standard operating procedures in US BSL-3 facilities vary between laboratories with select agent or non–select agent status. Comparisons are made for the following variables: personnel training, decontamination, personal protective equipment (PPE), medical surveillance, security access, laboratory structure and maintenance, funding, and pest management. Facilities working with select agents had more complex training programs and decontamination procedures than non–select agent facilities. Personnel working in select agent laboratories were likely to use powered air purifying respirators, while non–select agent laboratories primarily used N95 respirators. More rigorous medical surveillance was carried out in select agent workers (although not required by the select agent program) and a higher level of restrictive access to laboratories was found. Most select agent and non–select agent laboratories reported adequate structural integrity in facilities; however, differences were observed in personnel perception of funding for repairs. Pest management was carried out by select agent personnel more frequently than non–select agent personnel. Our findings support the need to promote high quality biosafety training and standard operating procedures in both select agent and non–select agent laboratories to improve occupational health and safety.

REFERENCE:
Richards, Stephanie L., Victoria C. Pompei, and Alice Anderson. “BSL-3 Laboratory Practices in the United States: Comparison of Select Agent and Non–Select Agent Facilities.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism : Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 12.1 (2014): 1–7. PMC. Web. 30 July 2015. -----------------------------------------------------------
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Pathogen transfer and high variability in pathogen removal by detergent wipes

BACKGROUND:
The rise in health care-associated infections has placed a greater emphasis on cleaning and disinfection practices. The majority of policies advocate using detergent-based products for routine cleaning, with detergent wipes increasingly being used; however, there is no information about their ability to remove and subsequently transfer pathogens in practice.
METHODS: Seven detergent wipes were tested for their ability to remove and transfer Staphylococcus aureus, Acinetobacter baumannii, and Clostridium difficile spores using the 3-stage wipe protocol.
RESULTS: The ability of the detergent wipes to remove S aureus, A baumannii, and C difficile spores from a stainless steel surface ranged from 1.50 log10 (range, 0.24-3.25), 3.51 log10 (range, 3.01-3.81), and 0.96 log10 (range, 0.26-1.44), respectively, following a 10-second wiping time. All wipes repeatedly transferred significant amounts of bacteria/spores over 3 consecutive surfaces, although the percentage of total microorganisms transferred from the wipes after wiping was low for a number of products.
CONCLUSIONS: Detergent-based wipe products have 2 major drawbacks: their variability in removing microbial bioburden from inanimate surfaces and a propensity to transfer pathogens between surfaces. The use of additional complementary measures such as combined detergent/disinfectant-based products and/or antimicrobial surfaces need to be considered for appropriate infection control and prevention.

REFERENCE:
Ramm L, et al. Pathogen transfer and highvariability in pathogen removal by detergent wipes. Am J Infect Control. 2015 Jul 1;43(7):724-8.
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Worker Health and Safety Practices in Research Facilities Using Nonhuman Primates, North America

Since 1975, federal quarantine regulations have restricted nonhuman primate importation to scientific, educational, or exhibition purposes to limit risks for disease introduction. Infectious diseases resulting from importation of nonhuman primates need to be prevented to ensure that colonies of these animals are available for research and to protect persons working with them from exposure to established and emerging zoonotic diseases.

REFERENCE:
Emily W. Lankau. Worker Health and Safety Practices in Research Facilities Using Nonhuman Primates, North America. Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 Sep; 20(9): 1589–1590. 
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Debate on MERS-CoV respiratory precautions: surgical mask or N95 respirators?

Since the emergence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in mid-2012, there has been controversy over the respiratory precaution recommendations in different guidelines from various international bodies. Our understanding of MERS-CoV is still evolving. Current recommendations on infection control practices are heavily influenced by the lessons learnt from severe acute respiratory syndrome. A debate on respiratory precautions for MERS-CoV was organised by Infection Control Association (Singapore) and the Society of Infectious Disease (Singapore). We herein discuss and present the evidence for surgical masks for the protection of healthcare workers from MERS-CoV.

REFERENCE:

Chung SJ, Ling ML, Seto WH, Ang BS, Tambyah PA. Debate on MERS-CoV respiratory precautions: surgical mask or N95 respirators? Singapore Med J. 2014
Jun;55(6):294-7.

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Guidelines for safe work practices in human and animal medical diagnostic laboratories. Recommendations of a CDC-convened, Biosafety Blue Ribbon Panel.

Prevention of injuries and occupational infections in U.S. laboratories has been a concern for many years. CDC and the National Institutes of Health addressed the topic in their publication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, now in its 5th edition (BMBL-5). BMBL-5, however, was not designed to address the day-to-day operations of diagnostic laboratories in human and animal medicine. In 2008, CDC convened a Blue Ribbon Panel of laboratory representatives from a variety of agencies, laboratory organizations, and facilities to review laboratory biosafety in diagnostic laboratories. The members of this panel recommended that biosafety guidelines be developed to address the unique operational needs of the diagnostic laboratory community and that they be science based and made available broadly. These guidelines promote a culture of safety and include recommendations that supplement BMBL-5 by addressing the unique needs of the diagnostic laboratory. They are not requirements but recommendations that represent current science and sound judgment that can foster a safe working environment for all laboratorians. Throughout these guidelines, quality laboratory science is reinforced by a common-sense approach to biosafety in day-to-day activities. Because many of the same diagnostic techniques are used in human and animal diagnostic laboratories, the text is presented with this in mind. All functions of the human and animal diagnostic laboratory--microbiology, chemistry, hematology, and pathology with autopsy and necropsy guidance--are addressed. A specific section for veterinary diagnostic laboratories addresses the veterinary issues not shared by other human laboratory departments. Recommendations for all laboratories include use of Class IIA2 biological safety cabinets that are inspected annually; frequent hand washing; use of appropriate disinfectants, including 1:10 dilutions of household bleach; dependence on risk assessments for many activities; development of written safety protocols that address the risks of chemicals in the laboratory; the need for negative airflow into the laboratory; areas of the laboratory in which use of gloves is optional or is recommended; and the national need for a central site for surveillance and nonpunitive reporting of laboratory incidents/exposures, injuries, and infections.

REFERENCE:
Miller JM, et al.; Biosafety Blue Ribbon Panel; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Guidelines for safe work practices in human and animal medical diagnostic laboratories. Recommendations of a CDC-convened, Biosafety Blue Ribbon Panel. MMWR Surveill Summ. 2012 Jan 6;61 Suppl:1-102. Erratum in: MMWR Surveill Summ. 2012 Mar 30;61(12):214.
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Evaluation of a Disinfectant Wipe Intervention on Fomite-to-Finger Microbial Transfer

Inanimate surfaces, or fomites, can serve as routes of transmission of enteric and respiratory pathogens. No previous studies have evaluated the impact of surface disinfection on the level of pathogen transfer from fomites to fingers. Thus, the present study investigated the change in microbial transfer from contaminated fomites to fingers following disinfecting wipe use. Escherichia coli (108 to 109 CFU/ml), Staphylococcus aureus (109 CFU/ml), Bacillus thuringiensis spores (107 to 108 CFU/ml), and poliovirus 1 (108 PFU/ml) were seeded on ceramic tile, laminate, and granite in 10-μl drops and allowed to dry for 30 min at a relative humidity of 15 to 32%. The seeded fomites were treated with a disinfectant wipe and allowed to dry for an additional 10 min. Fomite-to-finger transfer trials were conducted to measure concentrations of transferred microorganisms on the fingers after the disinfectant wipe intervention. The mean log10 reduction of the test microorganisms on fomites by the disinfectant wipe treatment varied from 1.9 to 5.0, depending on the microorganism and the fomite. Microbial transfer from disinfectant-wipe-treated fomites was lower (up to <0.1% on average) than from nontreated surfaces (up to 36.3% on average, reported in our previous study) for all types of microorganisms and fomites. This is the first study quantifying microbial transfer from contaminated fomites to fingers after the use of disinfectant wipe intervention. The data generated in the present study can be used in quantitative microbial risk assessment models to predict the effect of disinfectant wipes in reducing microbial exposure.

REFERENCE:
Lopez, Gerardo U. et al. “Evaluation of a Disinfectant Wipe Intervention on Fomite-to-Finger Microbial Transfer.” Ed. D. W. Schaffner. Applied and Environmental Microbiology 80.10 (2014): 3113–3118. PMC. Web. 9 July 2015.

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Analysis of variation in total airborne bacteria concentration to assess the performance of biological safety cabinets in microbial laboratories

BACKGROUND: The purpose of this study was to compare the concentration of total airborne bacteria (TAB) in biosafety cabinets (BSCs) at universities and hospital microbial laboratories to assess the performance of BSCs.
METHODS: TAB was determined by using the single-stage Anderson sampler (BioStage Viable Cascade Impactor). The samples were obtained three times (with the BSC turned off and the shield open; with the BSC turned off and the shield closed; and with the BSC tuned on and operating) from the areas in front of 11 BSCs.
RESULTS: TAB concentrations of accredited and nonaccredited BSCs were determined. No significant differences were observed in the TAB concentrations of the accredited BSCs and the nonaccredited BSCs for the areas outside the BSCs in the laboratories (p > 0.05). TAB concentrations for the BSCs sampled with the shield open and the instrument turned off showed differences based on the sampling site outside the BSC in each laboratory.
CONCLUSION: These results imply that TAB concentration is not altered by the performance of the BSCs or TAB itself and/or concentration of TAB outside the BSC is not a good index of BSC performance.

REFERENCE:
Hwang SH, Park HH, Yoon CS. Analysis of variation in total airborne bacteria concentration to assess the performance of biological safety cabinets in microbial laboratories. Saf Health Work. 2014 Mar;5(1):23-6.
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Respiratory Precautions for Protection from Bioaerosols or Infectious Agents: A Review of the Clinical Effectiveness and Guidelines [Internet].

There are a number of infectious diseases that are transmitted from person to person via the respiratory route, including influenza, tuberculosis (TB), and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, and these infectious agents are associated with considerable morbidity and mortality. Healthcare workers (HCWs) are vulnerable to exposure to these agents given the nature of their jobs, and as a result, risk both becoming infected, and spreading the infectious agents to other patients. To avoid transmission of these infectious diseases to (HCWs), exposure-appropriate respiratory precautions are sometimes necessary to protect both HCWs and the patients they care for. However, the selection of respiratory equipment depends on the pathogen, aerosol generation rate, and ventilation rate. Two types of devices that are commonly used to prevent transmission of airborne infectious agents are medical masks and respirators. For this report, medical masks (also known as surgical masks or surgical face masks) are defined as unfitted devices worn by the healthcare worker (HCW) “to reduce transfer of potentially infectious bodily fluids between individuals”. Masks are designed prevent droplets from an infectious patient from coming in contact with the mucous membranes in the nose and mouth of the person wearing the mask. It must be noted that masks are not designed to filter small airborne infectious particles. In contrast, respirators are “medical devices designed to protect the wearer from airborne infectious aerosols transmitted directly from the patient or when artificially created such as during aerosol-generating procedures”, and this is done by filtering the airborne particles (known as an air-purifying respirator) or supplying clean air to the person wearing the respirator (known as an atmosphere-supplying respirator). Air-purifying respirators are further classified by the efficiency at which they remove particles (95%, 99%, and 100%), and into N-Series respirators that are not resistant to oil (N95, N99, N100), R-Series that are resistant to oil (R95, R99, R100), and P-Series that are oil-proof (P95, P99, P100). As the Canadian Biosafety Standards and Guidelines note: “Using the wrong respirator or misusing one can be as dangerous as not using one at all”. Given the variety of devices, respirators, and potential infectious exposures, the purpose of this report is to identify studies and clinical practice guidelines examining the clinical effectiveness of exposure-appropriate respiratory protection for HCWs at risk of exposure to airborne infectious agents.

REFERENCE:

Respiratory Precautions for Protection from Bioaerosols or Infectious Agents: A Review of the Clinical Effectiveness and Guidelines [Internet]. Ottawa (ON):
Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health; 2014 Aug 19.

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Solicitamos tesista de licenciatura

Solicitamos pasante de licenciatura para realizar tesis en temas relacionados a la Bioseguridad. Ofrecemos amplia capacitación en el tema. Requerimos disponibilidad de horario. Podrá participar en sesiones de entrenamiento relacionados. Informes:  amexbio(arroba)gmail.com

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Emotional motivators might improve hand hygiene among healthcare workers

Campaigns that use feelings such as disgust might help to reduce healthcare associated infection better than rational campaigns that teach infection prevention, writes Layla McCay

Something about articles on hand hygiene in healthcare tempts us to turn the page. Hand hygiene: that bastion of infection control, inspiration for a thousand dog-eared posters proclaiming the critical moments, creator of chapped hands, consumer of time that could otherwise be spent with patients, general guilt inducer.

We know this. We all learnt the importance of hand hygiene back in medical or nursing school. We all sat through the mandatory training and read the hospital policies. We recognise that globally 5-15% of hospital patients acquire a healthcare associated infection during their stay.1 We have seen the studies: healthcare associated infections are being transmitted on the hands of healthcare workers all the time, whether we are measuring blood pressure,2 moving around the patient area,3or handling fluid secretions.4 We know all about hand hygiene.

REFERENCE:

BMJ 2015;351:h3968

http://www.bmj.com/content/351/bmj.h3968.full?ijkey=sCpSkOxEG2ot4TD&keytype=ref 

Surface-Dried Viruses Can Resist Glucoprotamin-Based Disinfection

Vaccinia virus

Touching of contaminated objects and surfaces is a well-known method of virus transmission. Once they are attached to the hands, viruses can easily get adsorbed and initiate infection. Hence, disinfection of frequently touched surfaces is of major importance to prevent virus spreading. Here we studied the antiviral activity of a glucoprotamin-containing disinfectant against influenza A virus and the model virus vaccinia virus (VACV) dried on inanimate surfaces. The efficacy of the surface disinfectant on stainless steel, polyvinyl chloride, and glass coupons was investigated in a quantitative carrier test. Vacuum-dried viruses were exposed to 0.25%, 0.5%, and 1% disinfectant for 5 min, 15 min, and 30 min without agitation, and residual infectivity was determined by endpoint titration. Although glucoprotamin was highly active against both viruses in suspension, limited antiviral activity against the surface-dried viruses was detected. Even after 30 min of exposure to 1% disinfectant, VACV was not completely inactivated. Furthermore, influenza A virus inactivation was strongly affected by the surface composition during the 5-min and 15-min treatments with 0.25% and 0.5% disinfectant. The results presented in this study highlight the relevance of practical tests to assess the antiviral activity of surface disinfectants. High virucidal activity in solution is not necessarily indicative of high antiviral activity against surface-dried viruses. In addition, we want to emphasize that the mere exposure of surfaces to disinfectants might not be sufficient for virus inactivation and mechanical action should be applied to bring attached viruses into contact with virucidal compounds.

REFERENCE:
Zeitler, Benjamin, and Ingrid Rapp. “Surface-Dried Viruses Can Resist Glucoprotamin-Based Disinfection.” Ed. M. W. Griffiths. Applied and Environmental Microbiology 80.23 (2014): 7169–7175. PMC. Web. 9 July 2015.
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An Evaluation of Antifungal Agents for the Treatment of Fungal Contamination in Indoor Air Environments

Fungal contamination in indoor environments has been associated with adverse health effects for the inhabitants. Remediation of fungal contamination requires removal of the fungi present and modifying the indoor environment to become less favourable to growth.  This may include treatment of indoor environments with an antifungal agent to prevent future growth. However there are limited published data or advice on chemical agents suitable for indoor fungal remediation. The aim of this study was to assess the relative efficacies of five commercially available cleaning agents with published or anecdotal use for indoor fungal remediation. The five agents included two common multi-purpose industrial disinfectants (Cavicide® and Virkon®), 70% ethanol, vinegar (4.0%−4.2% acetic acid), and a plant-derived compound (tea tree (Melaleuca alternifolia) oil) tested in both a liquid and vapour form. Tea tree oil has recently generated interest for its antimicrobial efficacy in clinical settings, but has not been widely employed for fungal remediation. Each antifungal agent was assessed for fungal growth inhibition using a disc diffusion method against a representative species from two common fungal genera, (Aspergillus fumigatus and Penicillium chrysogenum), which were isolated from air samples and are commonly found in indoor air. Tea tree oil demonstrated the greatest inhibitory effect on the growth of both fungi, applied in either a liquid or vapour form. Cavicide® and Virkon® demonstrated similar, although less, growth inhibition of both genera. Vinegar (4.0%–4.2% acetic acid) was found to only inhibit the growth of P. chrysogenum, while 70% ethanol was found to have no inhibitory effect on the growth of either fungi. There was a notable inhibition in sporulation, distinct from growth inhibition after exposure to tea tree oil, Virkon®, Cavicide® and vinegar. Results demonstrate that common cleaning and antifungal agents differ in their capacity to inhibit the growth of fungal genera found in the indoor air environment. The results indicate that tea tree oil was the most effective antifungal agent tested, and may have industrial application for the remediation of fungal contamination in residential and occupational buildings.

Keywords: Airborne fungi, indoor air quality (IAQ), vinegar, tea tree oil, inhibition zone

REFERENCE:
Rogawansamy, Senthaamarai et al. “An Evaluation of Antifungal Agents for the Treatment of Fungal Contamination in Indoor Air Environments.” Ed. William A. Toscano and Paul B. Tchounwou. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 12.6 (2015): 6319–6332. PMC. Web. 9 July 2015.
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Revista Mexicana de Bioseguridad

LA ASOCIACIÓN MEXICANA DE BIOSEGURIDAD A.C.convoca a participar en la:
REVISTA MEXICANA DE BIOSEGURIDAD

Participa con artículos para la difusión digital en nuestra revista sobre los temas relevantes sobre bioseguridad en México, compartiendo sus reflexiones, experiencias y resultados de investigación.
¡ CONOCE NUESTRA REVISTA AQUI !

Mínimo de 3,500 y máximo de 10,000 caracteres (contados sin considerar espacios con la herramienta “número de palabras” en Word).

Tipo de letra: Arial.
Referencias: Para agregar referencias al texto, favor de utilizar el formato de la revista PLOS One.   (http://www.plosone.org/static/guidelines#references)
Adjuntar una o dos fotografías DE SU AUTORÍA (QUE NO SEAN TOMADAS DEL INTERNET) ilustrativas del tema, en buena definición (8megapixeles o superior), con el respectivo texto explicativo que se pondrá al final del artículo.
Adjuntar una fotografía personal reciente con encuadre que abarque de busto a cabeza (medium shot) y un resumen de su Curriculum Vitae.

Enviar el o los textos que propones para publicar, al correo electrónico

revistamexicana(arroba)amexbio.org

Los textos propuestos para publicar serán revisados a la luz de los criterios de publicación.  La determinación de la comisión revisora será comunicada al autor.

ENVÍA ​YA ​TU PARTICIPACIÓN

​Consejo Directivo AMexBio

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Review and Phylogenetic Analysis of qac Genes That Reduce Susceptibility to Quaternary Ammonium Compounds in Staphylococcus Species

The qac genes of Staphylococcus species encode multidrug efflux pumps: membrane proteins that export toxic molecules and thus increase tolerance to a variety of compounds such as disinfecting agents, including quaternary ammonium compounds (for which they are named), intercalating dyes and some antibiotics. In Stapylococcus species, six different plasmid-encoded Qac efflux pumps have been described, and they belong to two major protein families. QacA and QacB are members of the Major Facilitator Superfamily, while QacC, QacG, QacH, and QacJ all belong to the Small Multidrug Resistance (SMR) family. Not all SMR proteins are called Qac and the reverse is also true, which has caused confusion in the literature and in gene annotations. The discovery of qac genes and their presence in various staphylococcal populations is briefly reviewed. A sequence comparison revealed that some of the PCR primers described in the literature for qac detection may miss particular qac genes due to lack of DNA conservation. Despite their resemblance in substrate specificity, the Qac proteins belonging to the two protein families have little in common. QacA and QacB are highly conserved in Staphylococcus species, while qacA was also detected in Enterococcus faecalis, suggesting that these plasmid-born genes have spread across bacterial genera. Nevertheless, these qacA and qacB genes are quite dissimilar to their closest homologues in other organisms. In contrast, SMR-type Qac proteins display considerable sequence variation, despite their short length, even within the Staphylococcus genus. Phylogenetic analysis of these genes identified similarity to a large number of other SMR members, found in staphylococci as well as in other genera. A number of phylogenetic trees of SMR Qac proteins are presented here, starting with genes present in S. aureus and S. epidermidis, and extending this to related genes found in other species of this genus, and finally to genes found in other genera.
Keywords: biocide resistance, MFS, MRSA, phylogeny, qac, S. aureus, smr

REFERENCE:
Wassenaar, Trudy M. et al. “Review and Phylogenetic Analysis of qac Genes That Reduce Susceptibility to Quaternary Ammonium Compounds in Staphylococcus Species.” European Journal of Microbiology & Immunology 5.1 (2015): 44–61. PMC. Web. 30 June 2015.
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Guidelines for the use of cell lines in biomedical research

Cell-line misidentification and contamination with microorganisms, such as mycoplasma, together with instability, both genetic and phenotypic, are among the problems that continue to affect cell culture. Many of these problems are avoidable with the necessary foresight, and these Guidelines have been prepared to provide those new to the field and others engaged in teaching and instruction with the information necessary to increase their awareness of the problems and to enable them to deal with them effectively. The Guidelines cover areas such as development, acquisition, authentication, cryopreservation, transfer of cell lines between laboratories, microbial contamination, characterisation, instability and misidentification. Advice is also given on complying with current legal and ethical requirements when deriving cell lines from human and animal tissues, the selection and maintenance of equipment and how to deal with problems that may arise.

Keywords: cell culture, mycoplasma contamination, Human Tissue Act, cell line, cell line misidentification, cryostorage, Human Tissue Authority, STR profiling, human tissue, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act

REFERENCE:
Geraghty, R J et al. “Guidelines for the Use of Cell Lines in Biomedical Research.” British Journal of Cancer 111.6 (2014): 1021–1046. PMC. Web. 9 July 2015.
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The race against time (two #ebola vaccines)

The first time Dr Ripley Ballou, Vice President of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Biologicals, contacted the World Health Organization (WHO) about a promising Ebola vaccine candidate, it was 24 March 2014 – the day WHO issued news of the Ebola virus disease outbreak in Guinea.
“I was told that since there were no human data, there were no policies or pathways for its use in the current outbreak,” Ballou recalls. ”There was also a strong belief that the usual approach of containments would stop the outbreak.”
When WHO called Ballou a few months later the picture had changed, and on 8 August WHO declared the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern.
“We realized this outbreak was different and the approach used successfully in previous outbreaks – detecting and isolating cases, identifying contacts and safely burying the deceased – was not working,” says Dr Marie-Paule Kieny, WHO Assistant Director-General for Health Systems and Innovation.
Within a month, Kieny and her team hosted a gathering of more than 200 of the world’s leading vaccine experts from industry, academia and regulatory authorities as well as public health officials from the countries affected and experts in filoviruses and viral haemorrhagic diseases.
REFERENCE:
“The Race against Time.”
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 93.1 (2015): 7–8. PMC. Web. 24 June 2015.
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Biocontainment of genetically modified organisms by synthetic protein design

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are increasingly deployed at large scales and in open environments. Genetic biocontainment strategies are needed to prevent unintended proliferation of GMOs in natural ecosystems. Existing biocontainment methods are insufficient either because they impose evolutionary pressure on the organism to eject the safeguard, because they can be circumvented by environmentally available compounds, or because they can be overcome by horizontal gene transfer (HGT). Here we computationally redesign essential enzymes in the first organism possessing an altered genetic code to confer metabolic dependence on nonstandard amino acids for survival. The resulting GMOs cannot metabolically circumvent their biocontainment mechanisms using environmentally available compounds, and they exhibit unprecedented resistance to evolutionary escape via mutagenesis and HGT. This work provides a foundation for safer GMOs that are isolated from natural ecosystems by reliance on synthetic metabolites.

REFERENCE:
Mandell, Daniel J. et al. “Biocontainment of Genetically Modified Organisms by Synthetic Protein Design.” Nature 518.7537 (2015): 55–60. PMC. Web. 24 June 2015.
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Online Resources for Understanding Outbreaks and Infectious Diseases

Disease outbreaks are hot topics that often receive extensive national and international news coverage, although this coverage may not always be accurate. Engaging students with these current events can be a powerful way to teach about science and health. Accurate disease information is also an important public health issue, as misinformation can lead to fear and poor policy decisions. In this review, we highlight online resources for teaching about outbreaks and infectious diseases that will be useful for scientists and educators working with middle school, high school, and undergraduate students. We particularly focus on current news about infectious diseases, epidemiology, pathogen biology, and vaccines.
Infectious diseases are caused by pathogenic microbes, including viruses, bacteria, and parasites. Some diseases, such as the flu, spread from human to human, while others rely on a vector intermediate—for example, malaria is transmitted by mosquitoes. Outbreaks, or epidemics, are characterized by the rapid spread of disease in a population. An outbreak that becomes global is referred to as a pandemic. In 2009, the global spread of H1N1 “swine” flu was a pandemic, whereas the outbreak of Ebola that began in 2014 is an epidemic in West Africa, not a pandemic.
REFERENCE:
Barber, Nicola C., and Louisa A. Stark. “Online Resources for Understanding Outbreaks 
and Infectious Diseases.” CBE Life Sciences Education 14.1 (2015): fe1. PMC. Web. 24 June 2015.
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Convocatoria para el conformar el Consejo Consultivo Científico de Sanidad Vegetal, Biología Molecular de Animales y Biotecnología en Alimentos

Por considerar que pudiera ser de su interés, les informo que se encuentra abierta la Convocatoria 2015 para formar parte del Consejo Consultivo Científico en las disciplinas de Sanidad Vegetal, Biología Molecular de Animales y Biotecnología en Alimentos hasta el  31 de julio de 2015.  Para mayor información, los invito a consultar las bases en nuestra página electrónica: CONACYT

Asimismo, agradeceremos su valioso apoyo para distribuir esta información entre aquellas personas que consideren pudieran estar interesadas y estimen pertinente.

Saludos cordiales,

Dra. Natalhie Campos 

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Survival of Enveloped and Non-Enveloped Viruses on Inanimate Surfaces

Abstract

In the present study, we evaluated the viability of non-enveloped viruses, minute virus of mice (MVM) and coxsackievirus B4 (CVB4), and enveloped-viruses, influenza A virus (H1N1) and herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV-1), on surfaces. We also investigated the impact of the initial concentration of proteins and sodium chloride on the persistence of infectious CVB4 on surfaces. Viral suspensions (>104.5 TCID50) were applied to petri dish lids and dried under the air flow of a biosafety cabinet. The recovered viral preparations were titered on appropriate cell lines. Enveloped viruses persisted for less than 5 days while CVB4 and MVM persisted for weeks. However, repetitive cycles of drying and resuspension had a stronger virucidal effect on CVB4 than on H1N1 and HSV-1. These repetitive cycles had no effect on the infectious titer of MVM. When exposed to drying, the initial concentrations of bovine serum albumin (from 0 to 90 mg mL−1), fetal calf serum (from 0 to 100%), and sodium chloride (from 0 to 300 mg mL−1) affected the viability of CVB4. CVB4 was more likely to be inactivated by drying in a protein-rich medium, whereas the impact of drying was reduced in the presence of sodium chloride. The results of the present study demonstrated that the resistance of viruses to drying, as suggested by iterative drying, was not due to the heterogeneity of viral subpopulations, but was influenced by media compositions and component concentrations, as illustrated in the model of CVB4.

Keywords: coxsackievirus B4, influenza A virus, minute virus of mice, herpes simplex type 1, persistence

REFERENCE:

Firquet, Swan et al. “Survival of Enveloped and Non-Enveloped Viruses on Inanimate Surfaces.” Microbes and Environments 30.2 (2015): 140–144. PMC. Web. 24 June 2015.

Fotos del 7º SIBB 2015 #AMexBio

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